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ABSTRACT
The article claims that there is a unique compensation criterion that
should be applied in all civil wrongs, inter alia, in tort, intellectual property and
property law. Where an individual wrongfully infringes the right of another, the
taker should be obliged to repay the victim her damages plus half the additional
attributed net profits derived from the taking. This article names this criterion the
Golden Rule. The suggested criterion contains three main components. First, for
example, a firm increased manufacturing with profits of $1,000, acted
wrongfully, and, as a result, someone suffered damages of $600-the taker
should pay the victim $800 (600+% (1,000-600)). Second, this rule applies even
where the victim suffered only negligible damages. In this case, the taker pays
the victim $500 (0+1 (1, 000-0)). Third, if the firm loses after paying the victim
her damages, for example, where the total profits are $400 (before paying the
victim's damages)-the taker pays the victim only her damages ($600).
The article examines modem physics for an analogical exploration of
the notion of phenomena that are hard to verify and current laws for any existing
application of the Golden Rule. It finds that patent law embraces major aspects
of the rule, inter alia, in the United States Supreme Court's influential ruling in
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.1 that limits the automatic operation of
injunctions and emphasizes the importance of the compensation scheme, and
especially in reasonable royalty-the most common criterion of patent
infringement compensation. The article claims that the reasonable royalty
criterion that requires the court to perform "hypothetical bargaining" between
the patent infringer and owner is theoretically equivalent to the Golden Rule.
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
[Vol. 121
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The article shows that the Golden Rule is already in use and that it is the
unique socially optimal rule of compensation for all civil wrongs. First, using
law and economics methodology, the article claims as follows: (1) in bargaining
settings, the Golden Rule fully protects the value of the victim's entitlements by
assigning the maximum value to her right to negotiate and sell her entitlement
by herself; damages awards eliminate this value; (2) where under-compensation
may be expected, for example, due to asymmetric information, damages awards
often lead to inefficient takings, while the Golden Rule ensures that only efficient
takings occur; (3) in settings of competitive markets for victim entitlements,
damages awards undermine the structure and operation of the markets by
allowing potential takers to force a purchase of entitlements at their costs, which
the Golden Rule may restore; and finally, (4) the Golden Rule may serve as a
proper debiasing mechanism for correcting risk estimation errors caused by
cognitive biases.
Second, the article claims that normative theories of both corrective and
distributive justice lead to the same unique, socially optimal Golden Rule
compensation criterion.
The article further suggests rules to implement the Golden Rule,
including ways to measure compensation by this criterion. Inter alia, where
takers' profits or victims' damages are elusive, the court may use takers'
financial ratios to determine the Golden Rule compensation. Where measuring
damages and gains is impractical, the article suggests that the court may apply,
mutatis mutandis, its ex-ante equivalent, namely the hypothetical bargaining
criterion of patent litigation.




A. The Main Research Question
This research examines the existence and applicability of a single golden
rule of compensation for all civil wrongs, inter alia, in tort, intellectual property
and property law, namely a unique criterion for courts and juries to determine
the proper pecuniary remedy for cases where an individual wrongfully infringes
a right of his fellow member of society. For this purpose, I use both law and
economics theories, including game theory, microeconomics, and behavioral
economics considerations, as well as normative theories of corrective and
distributive justice. Those two different approaches-law and economics, with
their emphasis on efficiency and distribution considerations, and normative
theories-are seen by some scholars as inconsistent and by others as
2018]
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complementary.2 The notion of complementary use of both methodologies to
address the same phenomenon is inspired by quantum theory.3
Albert Einstein is one of the founders of quantum theory, and in 1921,
he won the Nobel Prize for his contributions to science.4 Einstein presented the
idea that light comes in the form of energy quanta or photons.5 A year later, Niels
Bohr won the Nobel for a major advance in the theory-a model describing the
structure and operation of the atom.6 This model was the key to the principle of
wave-particle duality: elementary particles of both energy and matter have
simultaneously particle and wavelike properties, depending on conditions.7
Bohr developed the principle of complementarity, which means that
basic elements' behavior may be explained by viewing them as either waves or
particles. Bohr also considered this principle applicable for the understanding of
human phenomena.8 In tort law, following Bohr's ideas, Lzhak Englard
addressed the dichotomy between corrective justice and instrumental
considerations (as deterrence and distributive justice), and searched for ways to
bridge these difficulties. Englard suggested that "the inevitable incoherencies
inside tort law be justified by the idea of complementarity." 9 I follow this idea
and add another aspect to the analogy from quantum theory for the benefit of
identifying a proper compensation criterion.
Bohr's student, Werner Heisenberg, won the Nobel Prize in 1932 after
demonstrating that greater accuracy in determining the location of subatomic
particles is possible only at the expense of greater uncertainty in momentum, and
2 For the view of the normative approach of corrective justice as inconsistent with the
economic analysis of law, see, for example, Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the
Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107, 108 (2001)
[hereinafter Weinrib, Emerging Consensus]. For the view of the two approaches as
complementary, see, for example, IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 85-92 (Tom
D. Campbell ed., 1993).
3 For an explanation of quantum theory, see, for example, ASHER PERES, QUANTUM THEORY:
CONCEPTS AND METHODS 3-23 (Alwyn Van Der Merwe ed., 2002); and A. C. PHILLIPS,
INTRODUCTION TO QUANTUM MECHANICS 1-20 (D. J. Sandiford et al. eds., 2003).
4 Albert Einstein-Biographical, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/physics/1921/einstein/biographical/ (last visited Aug. 20,
2018).
5 Id.
6 Niels Henrik David Bohr-Biographical, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/physics/laureates/1922/bohr-bio.html (last visited Aug.
20, 2018).
7 For Bohr's duality principle, see PERES, supra note 3, at 3 23; and PILLIPS, supra note 3,
at 13 16.
8 See Niels Henrik David Bohr-Biographical, supra note 6.
9 See ENGLARD, supra note 2, at 55, 192-95. For normative theories' concept of compensation




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss1/8
ONE RULE TO COMPENSATE THEMALL
vice versa-the Uncertainty Principle.'" Bohr's and Heisenberg's theories
involve uncertainty as inherent to nature, leading to debates with Einstein that
produced his famous comment: "God does not play dice" with the world. 
In this article, I focus by way of analogy on another aspect of the
Einstein-Bohr debates. Bohr's and Heisenberg's theories questioned the
existence of particles independently of the measurement of their qualities, while
Einstein insisted that particles had properties, whether measured or not.'2
American physicist and science historian Abraham Pais recalls: "[D]uring one
walk Einstein suddenly stopped, turned to me and asked whether I really believed
that the moon exists only when I look at it."' 3
Analogically to Einstein's argument, I argue that where a member of the
society infringes another member's legal entitlement, even if the specific amount
of compensation that is socially desirable by economic and normative theories is
concealed behind the clouds, it exists. Moreover, its location may be
approximated, if not determined with absolute accuracy.
This article describes society as a place where individuals act and
thereby impose risks on other members of society, whether deliberately or
inadvertently. The potential infringer knows his expected value from the act and
the expected damages to his fellow from taking or infringing her right. After
infringing the victim's right, the actual harm to the victim and the infringer's
profits materialize.
B. A Short Presentation of the Compared Compensation Schemes for
Entitlement Infringement
In this article, I analyze three main compensation criteria for wrongs.
The first and most common civil remedy is damage award (hereinafter DA). For
the purpose of this article, DA basically means a calculation of monetary awards
for a specific loss. 14 In cases of tortious accidents, courts and juries usually grant
victims DA for their past and future losses. 5
10 The Nobel Prize in Physics 1932, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/physics/1932/summary/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2018). For more
on Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, see PERES, supra note 3, at 445; and PHILLIPS, supra note
3, at 1-20.
1 N. David Mermin, Is the Moon There When Nobody Looks? Reality and the Quantum
Theory, PHYSICS TODAY 38, 38 (1985) (analyzing the Einstein-Bohr debates).
12 Abraham Pais, Einstein and the Quantum Theory, 51 REvS. MOD. PHYSICS 863 (1979).
13 Id. at 907.
14 What is DAMAGES?, THELAWDICTIONARY.ORG, https://thelawdictionary.org/damages/
(last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
15 See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 3-4 (2d ed.
1993) [hereinafter DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES]; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1047 (2000)
[hereinafter DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS]; ROBERT S. THOMPSON ET AL., REMEDIES: DAMAGES,
2018]
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The second remedy I consider is disgorgement of profits (hereinafter
DoP), also called restitution remedy or accounting. This criterion requires the
infringer to restore any gains earned from the wrongful act. It is used in many
fields, usually in willful wrongs, for example as the main remedy for unjust
enrichment and in cases where money or property is taken by fraud, firm
misconduct, or copyright infringement. 1 6
The third criterion is the Golden Rule of Compensation (hereafter GR)
suggested here for all civil wrongs. By this criterion, in all civil wrongs where
an individual wrongfully infringes the right of his fellow member of society, the
taker should be obliged to repay the victim her damages plus half the additional
attributed net profits derived from the taking. Note that for the purpose of
subsequent calculations, the infringers' profit is that derived from the taking that
is attributable to the taking, i.e., attributed net profit (hereinafter ANP)."7 The
additional ANP from the taking is the infringer's ANP minus the victim's
damages (hereinafter additional ANP). The GR has three main components: (1)
payment at the amount of the victim's damages plus half the additional ANP
from the taking; (2) payment even in cases where the victim suffered only
negligible damages; and (3) in cases where the taker loses after paying the
victim's damages, payment at the amount of her damages.
Example 1 demonstrates these components. Example 1.1. A firm
increases its manufacturing with profits of $1,000, 18 acts wrongfully by failing
to install safety equipment, and as a result, a worker or someone else suffers
damages of $600. Under the current law, the DA is $600. However, under the
GR, the taker pays the victim $800 (600+ '/2(1,000-600)). 19 Example 1.2. Thanks
to moral luck, the worker suffers only negligible damages. Under the current law,
the firm does not have to pay. However, under the GR, the taker pays the victim
$500 (0+ (1,000-0)).2° Example 1.3. Realization of profits means the firm is at
loss after paying the victim her damages, for example, where the worker suffers
damages of $600 and the total profits are $400 (before paying the victim's
damages). The taker pays the victim her damages ($600), under both the current
law and the GR.
EQUITY, AND RESTITUTION 10 (4th ed. 2009). For a review on the law of DA, see infra Section
II.A.
16 See, e.g., DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 15, at 4-5; DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS,
supra note 15, at 1047; THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 11. For a review on the law of
restitution, see infra Section I.B.
17 For explanation of ANP and criteria for measuring it, see infra Section V.A.
18 Assume that those profits are the infringer's ANP.
19 GR = DA+ Y(ANP-DA) = (DA+ANP).
20 GR = O+(ANP-O) = ANP.
[Vol. 121
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C. A Roadmap to the Article's Claims
In Section I, I review the current legal application of the three main
compensation schemes compared in this article, DA, DoP and the GR, and argue
that the latter has strong foundations in the current law, especially in patent law.
In the influential ruling in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C., the U.S. Supreme
Court limited the automatic operation of injunctions in cases of patent
infringement.2' Plaintiffs prefer injunctions that give them a better hand in
negotiation for settlement. Under this ruling, injunctions should be granted only
under several conditions, inter alia, that damages are inadequate to compensate
the patent holder's injury.22 This ruling emphasizes the importance of the
question whether the compensation scheme is proper in different categories of
cases. In cases where the patentee is a manufacturer and is able to prove his
losses, courts apply the compensation criterion of the patent owner's lost
profits.23 In all other cases, usually where the patentee does not compete with the
infringer, they apply the criterion of reasonable royalty, which has become the
most common compensation scheme of patent litigation. 24 This criterion requires
the court to perform a hypothetical bargaining between the infringer and patent
owner based mainly on ex-ante parameters. Inter alia, I claim that the
hypothetical bargaining criterion reflects the GR criterion, that they are
theoretically equivalent, and that the lost profits criterion may be perceived as
applying the GR criterion, at least in most patent infringement cases involving
competitors where the patentee's costs exceed the infringer's profits.
In Section II, I present literature discussing the preferable compensation
criterion, harm-based (DA) or gain-based (DoP), as well as literature discussing
the reasonable royalty and lost profit criterion of patent litigation that reflects the
GR.
In Section III, I claim that the GR exists and is the unique socially
optimal rule of compensation for all civil wrongs.2 5 Following Guido Calabresi
and Douglas Melamed's method of analysis in their influential article, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral and an
21 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 388 (2006).
22 Id.
23 For a presentation of the lost profits criterion of patent litigation, see infra Section II.C.
24 For a presentation of the reasonable royalty criterion of patent litigation, see infra Section
II.C.
25 In another article, I present the GR criterion as the unique socially optimal rule of
compensation for torts. Here, I claim that the GR criterion has strong foundations in the current
law and develop a unified theory that justifies it as a unique socially optimal rule for all civil areas.
See Noam Sher, The Best Welfare Point: A New Compensation Criterion and Goal for Tort Law,
48 U. MEM. L. REV. 145, 154-55 (2017).
2018]
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extensive amount of subsequent literature,26 the analysis in this article perceives
wrongs as takings. For this purpose, I define taking as an event where an
individual unilaterally and forcibly appropriates another's protected right or
entitlement, meaning a legal right of a fellow member of society protected by
civil law. This definition includes the common setting of present-day commercial
and private activities, where a firm or individual hopes to gain from activities,
and their activities impose risks to potential victims.27 I claim that this premise,
that wrongs are takings, is grounded in law and economics analysis, as well as
in normative theories ofjustice, from Aristotle, who is considered the founder of
the corrective justice approach, through Enlightenment era philosophers of
natural rights to the modern philosophers who have developed the theory.28
Aristotle's notion of corrective justice is forcing the injurer to pay the victim's
damages, which eliminates the wrongful gains of the former and their correlative
losses caused to the latter.29 This notion of wrong is in the heart of modern
corrective justice theory.3 °
Using economic analysis of law, my arguments for the existence,
applicability, and desirability of the GR compensation criterion for all civil
wrongs are as follows. First, in a bargaining setting, I claim that the theoretically
equivalent ex-post GR and ex-ante patent litigation's hypothetical bargaining
criterion that divides the added value of the taking are the only Nash Equilibrium
solutions for hypothetical bargaining between an infringer and a victim. Hence,
the GR grants the victim the full and precise value for her right to sell her right
by herself, namely her right of disposition or alienation. It gives the remainder
to the taker at the same amount that is his part in the effort to create value. The
importance of maintaining the victim's right of disposition derives from theories
26 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1117-18 (1972).
27 For more on Calabresi and Melamed's theory and the extensive subsequent literature that
basically accepted their notion of efficient wrongful act that leads to infringer's gains and victim's
damages, see, for example, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (2002); and Michael 1. Krauss, Property Rules vs. Liability Rules, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 786 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). For a different
approach to torts whereby not all tort cases are takings, see Oren Bar-Gill & Ariel Porat, Harm-
Benefit Interactions, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 86 (2014) (Bar-Gill and Porat defined takings as a
specific category of harm-benefit cases, but according to my definition, all harm-benefit cases are
takings).
28 See Weinrib, supra note 2, at 108-13.
29 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. V (Robert William Browne ed., 1853). See
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 DuKE L.J. 277, 277 (1994)
[hereinafter Weinrib, The Gains and Losses].
30 Normative theoreticians challenge the approach of using the liability rule to incentivize
efficient taking. See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335, 1370-71 (1986). For normative theories' concept of compensation, my attempt to
bridge it, and law and economics' concept of compensation, see infra Section 1V.B.
[Vol. 121
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justifying property rights as being an essential tool for the purpose of, inter alia,
creating incentives to manufacture assets. While the DA criterion fully
eliminates the right of disposition in any wrongful taking, the GR fully protects
it-without detracting from the taker's share that was created by his initiative
and efforts.
Second, applying the transaction costs approach in a bargaining setting,
I claim that the literature explores reasons for under-compensation in many
fields, for example, due to victims' tendency not to sue, conservative legal
criteria of proving damages, and difficulties in calculating noneconomic losses,
particularly in cases of death and serious bodily injury. Since potential takers act
based on expected compensation rulings, it is straightforward that under the DA
criterion, under-compensation often leads to inefficient takings, while the GR at
least mitigates the phenomenon and under certain conditions ensures only
efficient takings occur.
Third, I consider settings of competitive markets for victims'
entitlements, and especially "thin markets," namely markets that are not highly
competitive. My argument is that the DA criterion undermines the structure and
operation of free and competitive entitlement markets by allowing potential
takers to force a purchase of entitlements at their costs, creating perfect price
discrimination of entitlement suppliers and resulting in too many takings, many
of them inefficient, and inefficient resource allocation. The GR criterion forces
hypothetical market prices that ensure the victim's entitlement costs and further
divide the additional ANP from the taking. Hence, it optimally mimics the
operation of free and competitive markets.
Fourth, I claim that with the rapid advances of technology that require
managers and other individuals to react by estimating risks in new settings, it is
important to find efficient debiasing mechanisms to correct risk estimation errors
caused by cognitive biases. While the DA criterion allows the inspection of
errors only where damages are significant, the GR criterion may solve moral luck
problems and debias estimates by giving numerous victims of minor wrongful
takings with small damages an incentive to sue and thereby involve all members
of society as agents for timely discovery of estimation errors.
Normative theories of justice use concepts other than those of law and
economics to consider social desirability of legal criteria. I adopt the notion of
complementarity to justify the use of methodologies of law and economics and
of normative theories of justice.3 My analysis shows, however, that corrective
and distributive justice lead to the same compensation criterion as law and
economics.
First, I claim that the GR criterion perfectly matches corrective justice
considerations. As mentioned above, Aristotle's notion of corrective justice is
that paying the victim's damages eliminates the wrongful gains of the injurer and
31 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
2018]
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the correlative losses caused to the victim.32 Modem theorists explain, however,
that since the injurer's gains and victim's losses are not necessarily identical,
Aristotle's explanation evokes a puzzle.33 The GR solves this puzzle by giving
the victim the precise value of her infringed right and allocates the taker his
honest share of the added value of the wrongful taking created by his efforts.34
Second, in the domain of distributive justice theories, I claim that the
GR criterion perfectly matches the Rawlsian basic criteria oflustice as fairness:
the hypothetical social contract and the veil of ignorance.35
In Section IV, I propose rules to implement the GR criterion in specific
categories of cases, including possible ways to measure compensation by this
criterion, in cases where the infringer's gains exceed the victim's losses, where
gains exceed negligible losses, and where losses exceed gains. In this section, I
discuss the importance of using objective parameters to measure the infringer's
ANP. Further rules on implementing the GR criterion deal with situations where
measuring damages or gains is elusive, suggesting that the relevant actual
damages or gains may be estimated by the taker's net profit margin ratio, defined
as the taker's net profits divided by his net sales (hereinafter NPM ratio).36 If,
for example, the infringer's ANP is measured at reasonable accuracy and the
damages are elusive, the court may use the infringer's NPM ratio to determine
the amount of damages, and in turn determine the compensation by the GR
criterion.
Where measuring both damages and gains is impractical, another rule
suggests that the court may use the GR's ex-ante equivalent, namely the
hypothetical bargaining criterion of patent litigation adjusted to each category
of cases of all civil wrongs.
Finally, the conclusions show that further research is needed, not only
on applying the GR, but on its reciprocity influence on the reasons and conditions
to move from this point of departure to another compensation criterion, for
example, to the higher between full DoP and DA, and to a possible shift to
injunctions.
32 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
33 Weinrib, The Gains and Losses, supra note 29, at 277-79. As a solution for this puzzle,
Weinrib suggests a distinction between material and normative gains and losses. For Weinrib's
and other modem philosophers' solutions for Aristotle's puzzle, see infra Section IV.B. 1.
34 In Example 1 above, the victim gains $800 (600+0.5(1,000-600)), $600 as damages and
$200 for her share in the added value from the taking, and the infringer gains $200 (1,000-800) for
his honest share of the added value of the wrongful taking. For an explanation of all three
components of the GR demonstrated in Example 1 above, see infra Section IV.B. 1.
35 For an explanation on distributive justice theories, John Rawls's notion of Justice as
Fairness, the Rawlsian hypothetical social contract and the veil of ignorance criterion of justice,
and for my argument that the GR perfectly matches these Rawlsian criteria, see infra Section
IV.B.2.
36 For an explanation of NPM ratio and for criteria for measuring it, see infra Section V.D.
[Vol. 121
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HI. MAIN APPLICABLE COMPENSATION SCHEMES FOR ENTITLEMENT
INFRINGEMENT
A. Damages Awards (DA)
In this Section, I review the current legal application of the three main
compensation schemes compared in this article, DA (damages awards), DoP
(disgorgement of profits), and the GR (the golden rule of compensation). The
DA criterion is the most common civil remedy and applies, inter alia, in tortious
accidents.3" The main objectives of tort law,38 from the approach of economic
analysis of tort law, are efficient deterrence, just compensation, and risk
distribution." The DA criterion meets the former objective by allowing the
injurer to act, impose risks on others, and take the victim's right where the taking
is efficient, if he is willing to pay its value.4" The corrective justice perspective
focuses on correcting the injustice that the injurer has done to the victim by
having him paying the latter her damages.41
In torts, recoverable costs are of different categories, including time loss,
direct expense incurred by the accident, and pain and suffering. 42 However, not
all costs are recoverable, and there are many adjustments and limitations to the
DA scheme. 43 For example, the law does not compensate for emotional harm
37 For a review of the law of DA, see, for example, DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 15,
at 208-363; DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 15, at 1047 75; DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS
AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 833
78 (7th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION]; and THOMPSON ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 205-378.
38 For the main objectives of tort law as reflected in court verdicts, see, for example, DOBBS
ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION, supra note 37, at 4-17.
39 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Tort Damages, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 682
83 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) [hereinafter Arlen, Tort Damages]; Omni
Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 632 (2016);
Hans-Bernd Schafer, Tort Law: General, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 569-71
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). For a discussion of the DA criterion's
inability to meet those objectives using law and economics theories and for my claim that the GR
criterion could achieve those goals, see infra Section V.A.
40 See, e.g., Arlen, Tort Damages, supra note 39; Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 39; Schafer,
supra note 39.
41 See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56-83 (2012) [hereinafter
WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW]; Weinrib, supra note 2; Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a
Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002) [hereinafter Weinrib, Corrective Justice]. For a
discussion of the DA criterion's inability to meet normative theories' objectives and for my claim
that the GR criterion could achieve those goals, see infra Section IV.A.
42 See, e.g., DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 15, at 10.
43 See, e.g., id.
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caused to the victim's family,' and many U.S. jurisdictions apply tort reform
statutes that put caps on pain and suffering. 45 Furthermore, DA measurements
using conservative auditing or assessorial techniques could lead to
underestimation of costs.46
In addition to regulatory restrictions, measurement problems of damages
might cause under-deterrence (and sometime over-deterrence) and reduction in
the correction of the harm.47 Inter alia, calculation of pecuniary losses is a
complex task and criteria for noneconomic losses are elusive.48 This problem is
more severe in cases of death and serious bodily injury, where the criterion for
determining damages is theoretically vague.49 In such cases, courts award
44 See, e.g., Hota v. NME Hosps., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 1539,1540 (E.D. La. 1988); DOBBS, T-t
LAW OF TORTS, supra note 15, at 821-52.
45 For a discussion of the structure of tort reform statutes that cap pain and suffering rewards
and of their pros and cons, see, for example, DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 15, at 1071-
74; Ronen Avraham, Does the Theory of Insurance Support Awarding Pain and Suffering
Damages in Torts?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW (Schwartz
and Siegelman eds., 2015); Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A
Critique of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
87, 97-101 (2006); Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Methodfor Helping
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 789-90 (1995);
Mark A. Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 263
(2008) [hereinafter Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, andDue Process]; and Joni Hersch
& W. Kip Viscusi, Saving Lives Through Punitive Damages, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 229 (2010).
46 For the relation between accounting conservatism and investor protection, see Jere R.
Francis & Dechun Wang, The Joint Effect of Investor Protection and Big 4 Audits on Earnings
Quality Around the World, 25 CONTEMP. ACCT. REs. 157 (2008). For factors that affect the
reliability of asset revaluations by appraisers, see Julie Cotter & Scott Richardson, Reliability of
Asset Revaluations: The Impact of Appraiser Independence, 7 REV. ACCT. STUD. 435 (2002).
47 See, e.g., Arlen, Tort Damages, supra note 39, at 693-95; DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra
note 15, at 851-52.
48 For the complexity and difficulty of calculating economic (pecuniary) and noneconomic
damages, see, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, Empirical Analysis of Tort Damages, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 463-73 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013).
49 For a discussion of the problem of determining DA in cases of death and serious bodily
injury, see Arlen, Tort Damages, supra note 39, at 697-711; Jennifer Arlen, Economics of Tort
Law, in 2 OxFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS 48 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) [hereinafter
Arlen, Economics of Tort Law]; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 257-61
(6th ed. 2012); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 228-33 (9th ed. 2014);
Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory, Empirics, and Doctrine,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 491 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013) [hereinafter
Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages]; and Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages
as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003) [hereinafter Sharkey, Punitive Damages as
Societal Damages]; see also Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, supra
note 45; Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 45.
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victims pecuniary losses plus awards for pain and suffering, and empirical
studies show that they tend to be under-compensated. 5
Empirical studies demonstrate victims' tendency not to sue in several
areas, 5 1 a phenomenon that could lead to under-deterrence and injustice. For
example, this phenomenon is severe in the field of medical malpractice. 2
Law and economic analysis permits damages that exceed the victim's
losses in special cases, including in cases where the wrongdoer might escape
liability (for example, due to the victim's tendency not to sue) and in cases of
death and serious bodily injury.53 Robert D. Cooter, 54 Mitchell Polinsky, and
Steven Shavel 55 suggested that in those cases, DA should be increased by adding
punitive damages, with the total damages equaling the harm multiplied by the
reciprocal of the probability that the injurer would actually be found liable for
all the harm they caused.56
50 See, e.g., Arlen, Tort Damages, supra note 39, at 697 711. ; Arlen, Economics of Tort Law,
supra note 49; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 49; POSNER, supra note 49; Sharkey, Economic
Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 49; Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages,
supra note 49.
51 For a review of empirical research that demonstrates victims' tendency not to sue in several
areas of tort cases in the U.S., see Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to Sue in England and the United
States of America: Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L. & Soc'Y 400 (1991). Research
conducted by the Institute for Civil Justice found claiming rates for traffic accidents to range from
39% of all cases arising from multiple vehicle accidents or single vehicle accidents where the
victim was not the driver to 89% for those leading to serious injuries. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER
ET AL., INST. CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(1991). Even in class actions, full compensation cannot be reached, since plaintiffs, including
institutional investors in securities fraud cases, sometimes fail to cash their settlement checks. See
Geoffrey Miller, Group Litigation in the Enforcement of Tort Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 267-69 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013).
52 See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort
Reform: It's the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1088-92, 1113-15 (2006) (reviewing
several studies and concluding that less than 2% of patients experiencing medical malpractice sued
for compensation); see also TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 22-42 (2005).
53 For justifications for punitive damages from law and economics perspective, see, for
example, Arlen, Tort Damages, supra note 39, at 695; Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive
Damages, supra note 49, at 489-92; and Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra
note 49; see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 49; POSNER, supra note 49; Geistfeld, Punitive
Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, supra note 45; Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 45. For
justifications for punitive damages from normative theories perspective, see, for example,
Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005).
54 See Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79
(1982).
55 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, Il1
HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
56 For a similar approach, see, for example, Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Market
Relationships, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1996). Notably, determining the accurate level of punitive
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U.S. law usually permits punitive damages, but only in cases of
intentional torts involving malice, or at least recklessness (and usually does not
permit punitive damages merely for the reason that the wrongdoer might escape
liability or the victim's death or serious bodily injury).57 From the law and
economics perspective, intentional torts such as deliberate trespass, assault, fraud
and conversion are similar to, and coincide with, criminal law.58 In this category,
the law's objective is to eliminate those takings that are inefficient and impose
risks and costs on society, and optimal deterrence means optimal crime
deterrence.59 Many of these cases involve low transaction cost environments,
and the courts actually refer parties to similar future takings to an ex-ante
preferable voluntary transaction.6" In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip,6' the U.S. Supreme Court held, based on normative theories, that the
purpose of punitive damages is deterrence and punishment.62 As discussed
below, the Supreme Court, however, did not hold that the injurer's profits from
the wrongdoing should be measured and fully eliminated.63
In Haslip, the Supreme Court enumerated factors that could be
considered in determining whether a punitive award was excessive or
damages to ensure optimal deterrence is an elusive task. See Arlen, Tort Damages, supra note 39,
at 695; Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 49, at 490-91.
57 For a discussion of the goals and use of punitive damages in U.S. courts, see DOBBS, LAW
OF REMEDIES, supra note 15, at 310-33; and DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION, supra note
37, at 856-78. For the differences between the courts' rationales of punitive damages in this
category of cases and the law and economics perspective, see, for example, Sharkey, Economic
Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 49, at 486-90; and Sharkey, Punitive Damages as
Societal Damages, supra note 49, at 359-65, 372-86.
58 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 160-63 (1987); POSNER, supra note 49, at 239-45; Arlen, Tort Damages, supra note 39, at
696; Stephen J. Shapiro, Overcoming Under-Compensation and Under-Deterrence in Intentional
Tort Cases: Are Statutory Multiple Damages the Best Remedy?, 62 MERCER L. REv. 449 (2011);
Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 49, at 488-90.
59 See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 58; POSNER, supra note 49; Arlen, Economics of
Tort Law, supra note 49; Shapiro, supra note 58; Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive
Damages, supra note 49.
60 See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 58; POSNER, supra note 49; Arlen, Economics of
Tort Law, supra note 49; Shapiro, supra note 58; Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive
Damages, supra note 49.
61 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
62 Id. at 19-20. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized in other cases the deterrence-punishment
rationale for punitive damages in intentional torts. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S.
471, 491-99 (2008); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). For
the courts' perspectives on punitive damage goals in cases of intentional torts, see DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES, supra note 15, at 318; DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION, supra note 37, at 859;
and Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 49.
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inadequate, including "the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct
and the desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant also
sustain a loss"-suggesting that eliminating injurers' gains could be
considered.64
The Supreme Court placed constitutional restrictions on the punitive
damage-to-DA ratios that might mitigate courts' and juries' power to efficiently
eliminate intentional infringer profits from wrongdoing. 65 In Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker,66 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its ruling in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell67 and held that a single-digit cap is
usually appropriate; that when compensatory damages are substantial-as in the
Exxon Valdez oil spill-a 1:1 ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages is an
acceptable upper limit.68 Notably, the court left the door open to a higher ratio in
exceptional cases, including those with intentional or malicious conduct that
exceeds recklessness; behavior driven primarily by avarice; and low economic
harm or odds of detection. 6
9
There are also cases where lower U.S. federal and state courts approve
a high ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages.7" In Mathias v. Accor
Economy Lodging, Inc.," for example-a case where damages and probability
of suing were low-Judge Richard Posner approved an approximately 40:1 ratio
of punitive-to-compensatory damages, based on the following rationale: "The
award of punitive damages in this case thus serves the additional purpose of
limiting the defendant's ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection and
64 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22.
65 See POSNER, supra note 49, at 243-44.
66 554 U.S. 471, 503 15 (2008). In this case, Exxon's captain was found to have had high
blood alcohol after his supertanker had spilled millions of gallons of crude oil into the Prince
William Sound in Alaska, causing enormous environmental damage. Id. at 475-80. Exxon spent
approximately $2.1 billion in cleanup efforts and pleaded guilty to criminal violations. Id. The jury
found the captain reckless, Exxon liable in torts for his recklessness (corporate liability), and
ordered damage awards as well as punitive damages. Id. The Ninth Circuit imposed damages of
$287 million and punitive damages of $2.5 billion. Id. at 509-14.
67 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
68 Id. at 425. Posner argued that if damages are low, single-digit multipliers fail to incentivize
highly meritorious suits, and in turn to deter intentional torts, and in this case, a higher multiplier
is required. See POSNER, supra note 49, at 243-44.
69 POSNER, supra note 49, at 512-13. Klutinoty criticized the strict one-to-one ratio imposed
in Exxon, supported the State Farm single-digit maximum-multiple due process approach that
better serves the objectives of deterrence and punishment, and suggested to apply the former only
in the maritime context and not in cases involving conduct more culpable than recklessness. See
Maria C. Klutinoty, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker: Why The Supreme Court Missed the Boat On
Punitive Damages, 43 AKRON L. REV. 203 (2010).
70 See DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION, supra note 37, at 872-76; Sharkey,
Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 49, at 498.
71 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003).
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(private) prosecution.-7 2 The approved ratio, however, as Judge Posner stated, is
arbitrary, namely because it does not reflect an attempt to determine and
precisely eliminate the injurer's profits.73 In other cases held after Exxon
Shipping, courts used ratios higher than 1:1 but without profit criteria
considerations.7 4
In sum, in tort cases where the injurer acts with intent, the Supreme
Court did not hold a DoP principle in the sphere of punitive damages or as a
unique compensation criterion. Note that not all jurisdictions outside the U.S.
acknowledge punitive damages as a legitimate tort measure, a fact that should be
considered by regulators seeking efficient universal commerce and by courts
seeking recognition and enforcement of their rulings by out-of-jurisdiction
courts. 
72 Id. at 677. In this case, Judge Posner held that a hotel was liable in fraud where it willfully
failed to warn guests against bugs, accepted the concept that the objective of punitive damages is
punishment and deterrence, and determined the high ratio in order to compensate for the under-
deterrence effect caused by the many times it got away. Id. at 675-77.
73 An earlier case where the court used punitive damages to deter intentional wrongdoing by
using a high ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages, with punitive damages estimated to be
higher than profits, albeit without investing effort in precise estimation and DoP, is Jacque v.
Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). In this intentional trespass case of moving a
mobile home through private land, the compensation was nominal. Id. at 156. The court stated that
[p]unitive damages, by removing the profit from illegal activity, can help to deter
such conduct. In order to effectively do this, punitive damages must be in excess
of the profit created by the misconduct so that the defendant recognizes a loss. It
can hardly be said that the $30 forfeiture paid by Steenberg significantly affected
its profit for delivery of the mobile home. One hundred thousand dollars will.
Id. at 165. Hylton discussed this case as an example for the court's acceptance of his suggestion to
consider injurers' gains elimination as a measure of punishment. See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive
Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEo. L.J. 421, 445-56 (1998). For Sharkey's
criticism on Hylton's analysis ofJacque v. SteenbergHomes, Inc., see Sharkey, Economic Analysis
of Punitive Damages, supra note 49, at 498. For a discussion on the appropriate rule for intentional
wrongdoing, see infra Section V.G.
74 See, e.g., Gabriel v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 1l-12307-MLW, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 39042, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2015).
75 Civil law countries and Japan do not award punitive damages in torts, and courts outside
the U.S. tend not to recognize punitive damages imposed by U.S. courts. See, e.g., Patrick J.
Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the Conflict ofLaws, 70 LA. L. REv. 529, 531
(2010) (discussing courts outside of the U.S.'s tendency not to recognize U.S. punitive damages);
Marco Cappelletti, Punitive Damages and the Public/Private Distinction: A Comparison Between
the United States and Italy, 32 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 799, 799 (2015) (discussing the rejection
of punitive damages in Italy); Madeleine Tolani, US. Punitive Damages Before German Courts:
A Comparative Analysis with Respect to the Ordre Public, 17 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 185,
186-87 (2011) (discussing the rejection of punitive damages in Germany).
[Vol. 12 1
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss1/8
ONE RULE TO COMPENSATE THEM ALL
B. Disgorgement of Profits (DoP)
The second remedy I consider is DoP. This remedy is part of the broader
restitution principle and is often called restitution remedy.76 This criterion
requires the infringer to restore any gains earned from the wrongful act. It is
designed to prevent the infringer's unjust enrichment.77 From the economic
analysis of law perspective, there are cases such as intentional torts where the
intentional taking is inefficient since it imposes risks and costs on society.7 8 In
those cases, the law should promote the objective of eliminating inefficient
takings and aim for complete deterrence by eliminating profits from the wrong.7 9
From the corrective justice perspective, the disgorgement remedy is a suitable
normative answer to the infringer's gain from wrongful acts, as the victim is
entitled to the infringer's abstention from the wrong that produced it.8°
Notably, in many cases, as in intentional torts, restitution is an
alternative remedy for DA, and the plaintiff is entitled to the higher
compensation of the two. 81 In contract fraud, for example, the plaintiff is required
to choose before the trial between annulment of a contract and applying for
restitution or affirmation of the contract and seeking damages. 
82
The broader restitution principle has both substantive and remedial
aspects: substantive, in being the basis and cause for the plaintiffs claim, and
76 For a review of the law of restitution, see, for example, DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra
note 15, at 365-491; and THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 379-464.
77 See, e.g., DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 15; THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 15.
78 For the concept that in willful intentional torts the law should achieve "complete
deterrence," see, for example, POSNER, supra note 49, at 239-45; and Sharkey, Economic Analysis
of Punitive Damages, supra note 49, at 48 8-90. For an economic analysis of typical cases that
justify DoP by unjust enrichment law, see Christopher T. Wonnell, Unjust Enrichment and Quasi-
Contracts, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS: CONTRACT LAW & ECONOMICS 795 (Gerrit
De Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011).
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL
INQURIES L. 1, 1 (2000) [hereinafter Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages]. For criticism of Weinrib's
arguments, see Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 138 (1999); and James Gordley, The Purpose of A warding Restitutionary Damages: A Reply
to Professor Weinrib, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 39 (2000). For a discussion of the
disgorgement criterion's inability to meet normative theories' objectives in cases of unintentional
wrongs and for my claim that the GR criterion could achieve those goals, see infra Section IV.B.
For a discussion of situations where it is appropriate to use the criterion of full disgorgement
compensation, see infra Section V.G.
81 See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 15, at 712-15; THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 15,
at 388-89; Robert D. Cooter & Ariel Porat, Disgorgement Damages for Accidents, 44 J. LEGAL
STUD. 249,249-50(2015).
82 See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 15, at 712 15.
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remedial, given the criterion for compensation.83 They are both defined in the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.84 As a remedy,
restitution is used in cases where the cause of action is unjust enrichment and in
other fields,85 for example, in intentional torts cases where money or property is
86taken by fraud, embezzlement, or conversion. In contract law, despite the fact
that expectation damages are the main remedy and disgorgement remedy is
controversial,87 the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
allows the disgorgement remedy for willful breach of contract whereby adequate
damage remedy is not available.88 Furthermore, in the United States,
disgorgement serves as a remedy in antitrust law, for example in cases of
dominant firm misconduct;" in securities regulations, as in cases of insider
trading; 90 and in intellectual property laws, as in cases of willful infringement of
83 See id. at 365-66.
84 The Restatement states that
the unjust enrichment of a conscious wrongdoer, or of a defaulting fiduciary
without regard to notice or fault, is the net profit attributable to the underlying
wrong. The object of restitution in such cases is to eliminate profit from
wrongdoing while avoiding, so far as possible, the imposition of a penalty.
Restitution remedies that pursue this object are often called "disgorgement" or
"accounting."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4) (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
85 For the disgorgement remedy in unjust enrichment law and other fields, see, for example,
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 15, at 366-68; Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits
Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 504 (1980); Mark P. Gergen, Causation in Disgorgement, 92 B.U. L. REv. 827 (2012);
George P. Roach, Unjust Enrichment in Texas: Is It a Floor Wax or a Dessert Topping?, 65
BAYLOR L. REv. 153 (2013); and Caprice L. Roberts, Supreme Disgorgement, 68 FLA. L. REv.
1413 (2016).
86 See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 15, at 367, 588-95, 597-612, 708-12.
87 For seminal research describing the dilemma of applying the expectation damages or
disgorgement principle to breach of contract, see E. Allan Famsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The
Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339 (1985); and
Friedmann, supra note 85; see also Roy R. Anderson, The Compensatory Disgorgement
Alternative to Restatement Third's New Remedy for Breach of Contract, 68 SMU L. REv. 953
(2015); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REv. 559
(2006); Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep Your Promises: A Disgorgement
Theory of Contract Remedies, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1181 (2011).
88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (AM. LAW INST.
2011). For a discussion of the adequate use of disgorgement as a contract law remedy under § 39,
see Anderson, supra note 87.
89 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79
(2009).
90 See, e.g., Thomas C. Mira, The Measure of Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions
Against Inside Traders Under Rule 1Ob-5, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 445 (1985).
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trademarks;9' design patent infringement;92 and copyright infringement, where
disgorgement is the main remedy.
93
C. The Golden Rule (GR) of Compensation in Current Laws
In cases of patent infringement, the U.S. Patent Act allows the patent
holder "damages adequate to compensate" him for the infringement, but no less
than "a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer."
94
Over the years of patent law development, courts have applied several
compensation schemes to compensate the victim in infringement cases,
including the patent owner's lost profits, established or reasonable royalty,
enhanced damages, and disgorgement of the infringer's illicit profits. 95
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2018). This section states that
[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office ... or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this
title ... the plaintiff shall be entitled ... to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any
damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.
Id. For a discussion of the necessity of willfulness as a precondition for awarding disgorgement
remedy in trademark infringement cases, see Rachel A. Zisek, Where There's a Will, There's a
Way: Reconciling Theories of Willful Infringement and Disgorgement Damages in Trademark
Law, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 463 (2015).
92 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2018). This section states that
[w]hoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner,
(1) applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article
of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article
of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall
be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250.
Id. For a discussion of the methods to award DoP in design patent infringement cases, see Thomas
F. Cotter, Reining in Remedies in Patent Litigation: Three (Increasingly Immodest) Proposals, 30
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 17-21 (2013) [hereinafter Cotter, Reining in Remedies].
93 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-(b) (2018). Section 504(b) states that "[t]he copyright owner is entitled
to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits
of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing
the actual damages." For further discussion of DoP in copyright law, see Kenneth E. Burdon,
Accounting for Profits in a Copyright Infringement Action: A Restitutionary Perspective, 87 B.U.
L. REV. 255 (2007); Joe Donnini, Downloading, Distributing, and Damages in the Digital Domain:
The Need for Copyright Remedy Reform, 29 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 413 (2013); and
Richard C. Wolfe & Serona Elton, Proving Disgorgement Damages in a Copyright Infringement
Case is a Three-Act Play, 84 FLA. BAR J. 26 (2010).
94 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018). This section states that "[u]pon finding for the claimant the court
shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event
less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
interest and costs as fixed by the court." Id.
95 For the history of patent law remedies, see Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653, 656 n. 13 (2010); and
James Ryan, A Short History of Patent Remedies, 6 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 150 (2015).
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In the era prior to 2006, if courts had found patent infringement, they
usually granted a permanent injunction against future infringement and
compensation for the past. 96 As mentioned above, the U.S. Supreme Court held
in eBay that injunctions should be granted only under several conditions, inter
alia, that damages "are inadequate to compensate" the patent holder's injury.
Otherwise, injunction should be denied and legal damages granted. 97
Since that ruling, courts have used two main compensation schemes.
Where the patentee is a manufacturer, would have sold products in the absence
of infringement, and is able to prove his losses, courts apply the criterion of the
patent owner's lost profits.98 This criterion is common in cases where the
infringer uses a competitor's patent.9 9 In all other cases, the common
compensation scheme is reasonable royalty. " The latter criterion is adequate in
cases where the patentee does not compete with the infringer, for example, when
the patentees are patent assertion entities (PAEs) °1 and in all other cases where
96 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 95, at 184-87, 187 nn.217-18,192, 199; Christopher B. Seaman,
Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REv.
1949 (2016).
97 In eBay, the Supreme Court held that
[t]he traditional four-factor test applied by courts of equity when considering
whether to award permanent injunctive relief to a prevailing plaintiff applies to
disputes arising under the Patent Act. That test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). For the history of the use of
injunctions in patent litigation, see Roberts, supra note 95; and Ryan, supra note 95. The literature
broadly justifies the eBay ruling, inter alia, since injunctions lead to risk of patent holdup. See, e.g.,
Cotter, supra note 92, at 10-13. For a review of empirical research examining the effect of the
eBay ruling, see Thomas F. Cotter & John M. Golden, Empirical Studies Relating to Patents-
Remedies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ECONOMIC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (forthcoming
July 2019) (manuscript at 4) (https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfi?abstract-id=2665680).
98 eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391.
99 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Remedies and Practical Reason, 30 TEX. L. REv. 125,
134-35 (2009) [hereinafter Cotter, Patent Remedies]; Cotter, Reining in Remedies, supra note 92,
at 17-21; William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages,
101 CORNELL L. REv. 385, 394-95 (2016); Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from
Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 655, 657-61 (2009); Ryan, supra note 95, at 174-
78; Carl Shapiro, Property Rules vs. Liability Rules for Patent Infringement 4 (Univ. of Cal. at
Berkley Working Paper, 2016) [hereinafter Shapiro, Property Rules],
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2775307.
100 Cotter, Patent Remedies, supra note 99, at 134-35; Cotter, Reining in Remedies, supra note
92, at 17-21; Lee & Melamed, supra note 99, 394-95; Lemley, supra note 99, at 657-61; Ryan,
supra note 95, at 174-78; Shapiro, Property Rules, supra note 99, at 4.
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the plaintiff cannot meet the court's requirements to establish lost profits. 102 This
remedy is the type of compensation most frequently awarded in patent
litigation. 103
As the statute language indicates, the patent owner may prove her lost
profits and reasonable royalties are a floor for those who cannot show actual
damages in the product markets. In cases of PAE patent infringement, where the
patentees do not manufacture, they cannot show actual losses in the product
markets (excluding rare cases where the PAE uses a policy of selling licenses at
the same price) and sue for reasonable royalties."
The reasonable royalty criterion means that the court should calculate
the outcome of a hypothetical bargaining between reasonable manufacturers and
PAEs. 105 Courts have developed ex-ante factors, known as "book of wisdom,"
to determine the outcome of this negotiation. Many of those factors were set in
1970 in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp. 106 In this case,
the court used a 15-factor test to assess the ex-ante hypothetical royalty, widely
followed by courts. 07 Those factors include royalties received by the same PAE
102 See, e.g., Cotter, Reining in Remedies, supra note 92, at 21-30; Erik Hovenkamp &
Jonathan Masur, How Patent Damages Skew Licensing Markets, 36 REv. LINIG. 379, 385-96
(2017); Lee & Melamed, supra note 99, at 395-98; Lemley, supra note 99, at 661-69; Ryan, supra
note 95, at 193 200.
103 See Cotter, Reining in Remedies, supra note 92, at 9; Shapiro, Property Rules, supra note
99. According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) study, from 2005 to 2014 reasonable royalties
were the type of compensation most frequently awarded in patent cases (81%), which is more than
double the frequency of lost profits awards (31%) (in several cases, the courts granted a
combination of reasonable royalties and lost profits), while the use of other schemes was negligible
(compensating for price erosion in 2% of cases). PWC, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: A
CHANGE IN PATENTEE FORTUNES 8 (2015), www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2015-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
104 See, e.g., Cotter, Reining in Remedies, supra note 92, at 9-10, 21-30; Lee & Melamed,
supra note 99, at 395-98; Lemley, supra note 99, at 661-69; Ryan, supra note 95, at 193-200. In
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., decided in 1978 and widely followed, the court
set a high requirement for the patentee, stating that
[t]o obtain as damages the profits on sales he would have made absent the
infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent owner must prove: (1)
demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable noninfringing
substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the
demand, and (4) the amount of the profit he would have made.
575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of this requirements, see, for example, Lee
& Melamed, supra note 99; and Lemley, supra note 99.
105 See, e.g., Lee & Melamed, supra note 99, at 393.
106 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modifyingjudgment, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
107 For a discussion of the Georgia-Pacific 15-factor test, its application by U.S. courts, and
academic debate on how to configure the royalties, see, for example, Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren
W. Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Damages: An Economic and
Comparative Analysis of the Case Law from China, the European Union, India, and the United
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in the past and royalties payed by the same manufacturer to other PAEs in
comparable circumstances.'0 8
My claim is that, theoretically, the negotiation between the manufacturer
and the PAE, if conducted between equal players, would lead to a division of the
added value from the transaction as expected by the parties that use the expected
values of costs and profits to determine the negotiation gap: the expected costs
for the PAE, who is expected to lose part of her ability to further sell her rights,
and the manufacturer's expected profits from using the advanced technology.
The GR criterion divides the gap created by the realization of the same values
expected before the taking: the actual PAE's costs and the actual manufacturer's
profits from the taking. Therefore, the hypothetical bargaining, if performed
between equal players, ex-ante reflects the GR criterion, and both are
theoretically equivalent.' 09
The GR criterion means that if the patentee's damages and the
infringer's profits are known, the added value from the taking should be shared.
In infringement of PAE rights, this is rarely the case. Therefore, its ex-ante
reflection, namely the reasonable royalty criterion, uses expectations of the same
values--expected damages and profits that define the hypothetical bargaining
gap--as a theoretically equivalent alternative solution.
As mentioned above, lost profits are applied in cases where the infringer
uses a competitor's patent. For example, a manufacturer enters a new product
market and infringes a patent owned by a monopoly. The literature widely
advocates this different remedy for the competition sets.11 ° The patentee-
competitor invests in the production of a patent to use it in her own
manufacturing and benefit from its monopolistic power in the product market.
Therefore, to make her whole, the patentee should receive a payment in the
States, 8 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 127 (2017); Lee & Melamed, supra note 99, at 395-98, 411-(4;
Lemley, supra note 99, at 661-69; Ryan, supra note 95, at 196; and Douglas Melamed, Over-
Rewarding Patenting: You Get What You Pay For, 39 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (2016).
108 Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
09 The nature of the reasonable royalty criterion led Judge Posner to classify the reasonable
royalty remedy as restitution, in suitable cases, stating that
[a] reasonable royalty is a form of damages when awarded in the damages phase
of an infringement litigation, though it usually is a form of equitable relief, as
we'll see, when it is imposed, in lieu of an injunction, to prevent future harm to
the patentee. The difference between conventional damages and a royalty is that
often a royalty is actually a form of restitution a way of transferring to the
patentee the infringer's profit, or, what amounts to the same thing, the infringer's
cost savings from practicing the patented invention without authorization.
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 909-10 (N.D. Ill. 2012); see also Cotter,
Reigning in Remedies, supra note 92, at 26. In this article, I consider reasonable royalties distinct
from damages and restitution, and a remedy aimed at adequately dividing the added value of
wrongful albeit permitted transactions.
110 See supra note 99.
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amount of the profit she would have made but for the infringement of her right,
including losses of future market share due to a decrease in her reputation.
1
Including all patentee costs in compensation schemes basically implies that the
applied compensation criterion is DA.
My claim is that in most patent infringement cases where the rule of
compensation is lost profit, it may also be perceived as an application of the GR
criterion. The patentee has monopoly power, and if an infringer and a patentee
compete, the rivalry leads to lower product price, and an increase in the quantity
of the product sold in the market and in consumer surplus. The patentee-
monopoly loses profits and the infringer-competitor gains from the taking. The
total producers' profits, however, may increase or decrease, depending on the
market structure. In most cases, they decrease. In turn, the infringer has to pay
higher damages than his profits. "2 Notably, in this case, the damages ruling
matches the GR criterion since the rule specifies that if the damage exceeds the
profits the infringer must pay the victim's damages.
If the market's structure, however, leads to higher profits for two
competitors in the post-infringement's market compared to the profits for a
single monopoly in the post-infringement market, a rule of lost profits is
inadequate. As I argue in this article, if there are profits from an infringement
higher than the injurer's costs, the added value of the taking should be shared. '
Note that according to current U.S. law, the DoP rule does not dominate
the infringer's duty to compensate. Alternatively, the U.S. Patent Act states: "the
court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed."'I " In In re Seagate Technology, L.L.C., 5 the court held that willful
or bad faith infringement are required to establish enhanced damages, and that
failure to perform due care does not meet this standard. As discussed above, in
other fields of law, including other intellectual property domains, willful
infringement entitles the victim to disgorgement of the taker's profits. " 6 As
mentioned above, the U.S. Copyright Act allows the victim of copyright
I See Lemley, supra note 99, at 661 nn.29-30.
112 See Lemley, supra note 99 and accompanying text.
113 See infra Sections IV and V.A.
114 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018).
"15 See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated by Halo
Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). For the history of the enhanced damages
remedy, see Ryan, supra note 95, at 178-83. For a discussion of the court's ruling in In re Seagate
Technology, LLC, see Lee & Melamed, supra note 99, at 401-02; and Ryan, supra note 95. For a
model for determining the value of super-compensatory patent infringement awards based on the
patent's social value, see Mengxi Zhang & Keith N. Hylton, Optimal Remedies for Patent
Infringement (B. U. Sch. of Law Working Paper, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2698413.
116 For a call that patent law should at least accept DoP as a remedy for willful infringement,
see Roberts, supra note 95.
2018]
23
Sher: One Rule to Compensate Them All
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
infringement to recover her actual damages and any profits of the infringer that
are attributable to the infringement, without being required to prove willful
infringement."17 The act states that, alternatively, the victim may be entitled to
statutory damages.1 8
In recent years, courts apply an indirect method to establish
compensation in cases where the copyright owner (1) is unable to prove her
damages and the infringer did not gain profits from the taking, denying her any
regular compensation; and (2) has failed to timely register her work, denying her
statutory damages." 9 In those circumstances, courts apply the value-of-use
criterion to establish compensation, determined by hypothetical bargaining over
license fee.' 0 This criterion actually applies, mutatis mutandis, patent law's
reasonable royalty criterion. 121
I. THE LITERATURE'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE MAIN APPLICABLE
COMPENSATION SCHEMES FOR ENTITLEMENT INFRINGEMENT
A. Damages Awards (DA) and Litigation Biases
In this section, I present literature discussing the preferable
compensation criterion, harm-based (DA) or gain-based (DoP), as well as
literature discussing the reasonable royalty and lost profit criterion of patent
litigation that reflects the GR. My claim in the article is that the GR criterion is
117 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-(b) (2018); see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
118 Id. § 504(a), (c). Section 504(c) states
the copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to
recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for
all infringements involved in the action . .. in a sum of not less than $750 or
more than $30,000 as the court considers just .... (2) In a case where... the
court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion
may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.
In a case where... the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no
reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the
court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not
less than $200.
Id. § 504(c).
119 See On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2001); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google
Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2012). For a review of this development, see Kevin
Bendix, Copyright Damages: Incorporating Reasonable Royaltyfrom Patent Law, 27 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 527, 532-37 (2012). Bendix argued that in calculating reasonable royalties in copyright
law, courts may use the Georgia-Pacific factors as a baseline and adjust them to the copyright
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the proper compensation scheme for all civil wrongs, and therefore, the
reasoning of patent litigation literature for the advantages of its equivalent rules
in patent law is valuable.
The literature discusses the importance of DA and its accurate
measurement. The law and economics literature emphasizes full DA to achieve
optimal deterrence: with full DA, the injurers take all relevant social costs into
account, internalize the risk for damage, and act at a socially optimal level
including optimal care.1 22 As mentioned above, regulatory restrictions and
measurement problems, as in cases of death and serious injury,123 and victims'
tendency not to sue 124 might cause under-deterrence. The Punitive Damages
Multiplier formula, as articulated by Cooter, and by Polinsky and Shavell, is
aimed to solve under-deterrence problems.125 It is limited, however, by legal
requirements for injurer's bad behavior and by constitutional restrictions. 1
26
An extensive literature explores reasons for takers and victims to agree
in settlement before and during trial to payments different from actual damages
(assuming courts rule DA). 127 Lucian A. Bebchuk demonstrated how litigation
costs 128 and information asymmetry between takers and victims2 9 create this
phenomenon. 3 0 Court errors might have the same effect. Kaplow and Shavell,
however, argued that if courts' assessments of DA are expected to be correct on
average, the potential injurer's decision is expected to be efficient.' 3
The law and economics literature also provides reasons for partial DA.
For example, Cooter showed that under negligence regime, a lesser award may
122 In the context of torts, see, for example, GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26
31 (1970); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 49, at 217-20; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 5-45 (1987); Arlen, Economics of Tort Law, supra note 49, at 47-55; Arlen, Tort
Damages, supra note 39, at 682; and Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
29 (1972).
123 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
125 See Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 54; Polinsky & Shavell,
supra note 55. For their arguments, see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 57-74 and accompanying text.
127 For a review of the literature and theory of litigation and settlement, see, for example, Bruce
L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of Litigation, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); and J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier,
A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2016).
128 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats
to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Bebchuk, A New Theory].
129 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437
(1988) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract].
130 See infra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.
131 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON.
191 (1996). For a discussion of their arguments, see infra note 209 and accompanying text.
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suffice to induce due care because any decrease in investment in care might
dramatically increase potential injurers' expected liability.132 Arlen and
MacLeod argued133 that damages for accidental negligence must be less than the
value of the harm because they are needed to internalize the social costs of
underinvestment in expertise and not in precaution. D'Antoni and Tabbach
showed'34 regulation could support an equilibrium in which the potential injurer
acts at optimal care and the potential victim relies on his optimal effort and acts
optimally, in settings of bilateral accidents, under a negligence rule, where
victims could not receive full compensation.
Polinsky and Shavell argued135 that harm-based liability is preferable to
gain-based liability. They compared requiring a wrongdoer to pay DA to
requiring him to pay his savings from his misconduct. In their basic example, 3 6
an individual failed to take precaution, saved himself costs of $ 1,000, and caused
harm of $10,000 to a patient. In cases where harm exceeds gains (socially
undesirable acts that should be deterred), and where harm and gains are correctly
assessed, both deter wrongdoings. 13 7 Where courts might err in assessment of
damages and gains (calculated by injurer's savings), under harm-based liability,
an individual is not likely to commit wrongdoing when the harm greatly exceeds
his gains (10,000>>1,000).138 Under gain-based liability, underestimation of
gains leads to injurer profits from inefficient taking (committing wrongdoing
when the harm is higher than the gains).139
As mentioned above, Polinsky and Shavell determined the wrongdoer's
gains by his savings from undertaking precaution. This amount, however, could
be lower than his profits. In those common cases (where profits exceed savings
from wrongdoing), even without court errors, a savings compensation criterion
cannot deter inefficient takings. Their argument may be adjusted as follows to
cases where savings are lower than profits: taking court errors into account,
where damages exceed injurer profits, the DA is preferable to the DoP criterion,
but not to disgorgement of savings that might be much lower than profits.
132 Robert D. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 1523 (1984); see also Arlen,
Tort Damages, supra note 39, at 685.
133 Jennifer Arlen & Bentley W. Macleod, Torts, Expertise and Authority: Liability of
Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 494 (2005).
134 Massimo D'Antoni & Avraham D. Tabbach, The Complementary Role of Liability and
Safety Regulation (Apr. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://eale.org/content/uploads/2017/05/liability-and-regulation.pdf).
135 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim
or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 427 (1994).
136 Id. at 427.
137 Id.
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In cases of inefficient takings (where damages exceed profits), even
without court errors, another relative advantage of the DA criterion is its ability
to better insure potential victims' entitlement and distribute risks.140
As mentioned above,141 the third component of the GR is that if the firm
loses after paying the victim her damages, for example, where total profits are
$400 (before paying damages)--the taker pays the victim only her damages of
$600. This component is consistent with Polinsky and Shavell's argument. As
argued below, '42 however, taking court errors into account, the GR is the optimal
criterion to deter inefficient and secure efficient takings, not only when damages
exceed profits, but in all cases. It is less sensitive to court errors than DA, and
with sufficiently low errors, leads to efficient takings and otherwise best
mitigates error effects. 1
43
As mentioned in Part I, Aristotle's explanation-that forcing the injurer
to pay damages eliminates wrongful gains--evokes a puzzle, 144 because the
injurer's gains and victim's losses are not necessarily identical.'45 Weinrib
argued 146 that Aristotle perceived the gains and losses of corrective justice as
normative, and proposed the notion of normative gains and losses; his
explanations, possible counter-arguments, and how the GR criterion solves this
puzzle are discussed in detail below.' 47 In brief, Weinrib explained1 48 that the
law chooses harm-based liability in tort law or gain-based liability in unjust
enrichment law for normative reasons, and that
[i]n the Aristotelian account, the terms "gain" and "loss" are a way
of representing the occurrence of the injustice that liability
rectifies. What matters is whether the transaction can be regarded
as yielding the defendant more and the plaintiff less than the
parties ought to have, given the norm that should have governed
140 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the DA criterion's inability
to meet those objectives using law and economics theories and my claim that the GR can meet
them, see infra Section IV.A.
141 See Example 1.3, supra Section I.B. For the other two components, defining the rules of
compensation for cases where profits exceed DA and where there are profits with negligible
damages, see Examples 1.1 and 1.2, respectively, supra Section I.B.
142 See infra Section IV.A.2.
143 Porat and Stein discussed as an alternative the notion of risk-based liability, meaning
compensation for expected harm. See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 101-29 (2001). They claim that in most cases, this criterion is hard to enforce and
not implementable. See id.; see also Cooter & Porat, supra note 81, at 254 55.
144 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
145 Weinrib, The Gains and Losses, supra note 29, at 277-79.
146 Id. at 286-89.
147 See infra Section IV.B.1.
148 Weinrib, The Gains and Losses, supra note 29, at 286-89.
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their interaction. In tort cases, therefore, liability for injuring the
plaintiff is predicated not on some parallel increase in the
defendant's resources, but on the defendant's having unjustly
inflicted that loss. Similarly, in the case of unjust enrichment, the
plaintiff recovers the defendant's gain not when the plaintiff has
suffered a corresponding material loss, but when the defendant's
enrichment represents an injustice to the plaintiff. 149
B. Disgorgement of Profits (DoP)
As discussed above, 15 ' from the economic analysis of law perspective,
DoP is required to bar inefficient takings by creating complete deterrence, and
from the corrective justice perspective, it is a suitable normative answer to the
taker's unjust gains. Hylton suggested 51 eliminating injurers' gains as a measure
of total deterrence and punishment in punitive damages cases where the offender
usually gains less than the victim loses, as well as in punitive damages cases
where gains exceed losses but there are substantial secondary losses, 152 meaning
indirect costs imposed on the society by the wrongdoing. A possible reason for
this is the "[1]ong run effects and misperception by offenders."' 53 He claimed
that "[i]f the penalty is set at a level that eliminates gain--or at the level that
internalizes loss when loss is greater than gain-no rational offender will commit
an offense. There should be no need, then, to worry about possible long run
effects." '154 Another reason is that measuring gains is often the easier and "least
expensive policy to implement."' 55
Sharkey argued'56 that Hylton's view of deterrence is inconsistent with
optimal deterrence because Hylton permits punishments to promote total
deterrence. As in Sharkey's analysis, my basic notion of wrongs as takings
assumes there are many civil law cases where potential wrongdoers may impose
risks on others, despite acting efficiently. Eliminating profits as a rule contradicts
this basic understanding of the society's structure and operation.
A possible answer to any application of DoP in cases where damages
exceed profits may derive from Polinsky and Shavell's research-taking court
errors into account, the DA criterion (even with a multiplier) is preferable to DoP
149 Id. at 286.
15o See supra Section I.B.
151 See Hylton, supra note 73.
152 For a definition of secondary losses and justifications for compensation schemes based on
gains where they are substantial, see Hylton, supra note 73, at 433-39.
153 Id. at 431-33.
154 Id. at 43 1.
155 Id. at 433.
156 See Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 49, at 492-93.
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(even with a multiplier).'57 Furthermore, as explained above, the DA criterion
better insures potential victims' entitlement and distributes risks, whereas low
gains (even with a multiplier) might not be high enough to repay the victim's
costs.
Cooter and Porat proposed a compensation equal to an injurer's gain
from untaken precaution divided by the probability of liability, ' a scheme they
named disgorgement of damages for accidents, or DDA. Their basic example is
a medical malpractice case.' 59 Consider, a medical test costs $20. Omitting the
test causes harm of $1,000 to a patient with probability of 0.1. The doctor omits
the test and the harm materializes. Under the DA criterion, the doctor pays
$1,000. Under the DDA criterion, he pays $200 (20/0.1). They claimed that the
latter is the minimum amount that would deter the doctor.'60 Cooter and Porat
proposed
disallowing compensation and limiting damages to DDA in well-
defined classes of cases satisfying two conditions: first, DDA is
easier to measure than compensation, and, second, DDA creates
better incentives. Incentives are better under DDA when reducing
damages below compensation has positive effects on victims'
precautions and activities that exceed any negative effects on
injurers' precautions and activities.' 6
Notably, Cooter and Porat did not use DoP in its common application
that requires the infringer to restore any gains earned from the wrongful act.'62
Instead, as shown above, their example referred to disgorgement of savings. As
they explained, "DDA is lower than compensatory damages."' 63 In cases where
DA exceeds profits (inefficient taking) and profits exceed DDA (where
DA>DoP>DDA), the gap between profits and DDA might incentivize many
inefficient takings. In Cooter and Porat's example, if the injurer's profit from
157 See supra Section lI.A.
158 See Cooter & Porat, supra note 81. In Cooter and Porat, the probability of liability equals
the probability of an accident. See id. at 250, 255. As they explained, this is different from previous
literature, especially Cooter's and Polinsky and Shavell's research on cases where there is positive
probability that injurers escape liability, which they named probability of enforcement. See Cooter,
supra note 54; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 55. For presentation of their arguments, see supra
notes 53-56 and accompanying text; and Hylton, supra note 73.
159 Cooter & Porat, supra note 81, at 250.
160 Id. at 250-51.
161 Id. at 254. Cooter and Porat argued that medical malpractice cases often satisfy the two
conditions. Id.
162 For the DoP criterion, see supra Section I1.B.
163 Cooter & Porat, supra note 81, at 250.
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wrongdoing is $500, then a DDA of $200 would not deter him from gaining $300
(500-200). 164
Furthermore, as Polinsky and Shavell argued, taking under-
compensation due to court errors into account, where damages exceed DDA (and
profits equal savings), the DA criterion does not induce inefficient takings while
DDA does, and is therefore preferable. Notably, in those cases, the low amount
calculated by DDA would not compensate the victim for her losses.
Several scholars called to expand the DoP rule in specific cases
(including partial disgorgement). In his seminal article, Restitution for Wrongs.
The Measure of Recovery, Friedmann discussed expanding the disgorgement
remedy in civil cases. 165 He proposed an alternative that expands the
wrongdoer's duty of disgorgement, even in specific cases of non-willing
infringement, based on the principle of causality between the wrongful act and
the wrongdoer's profits. 166 Furthermore, he suggested four alternative schemes
to determine disgorgement: two similar schemes suggest the infringer should pay
the profits to the plaintiff after deducting his investment. 167 The third scheme
suggests paying the plaintiff the market value of her right. 168 An intermediate
fourth scheme suggests dividing the profits between the plaintiff and defendant
in accordance with their relative contribution (common in cases of wrongdoer
and plaintiff joint-ventures). 169 In The Liberal Commons, "7 Dagan and Heller
offered three similar possible solutions.
164 This problem of DDA incentivizing inefficient takings is exacerbated by applying a
multiplier not only to savings, but also to savings, profits, and damages. If, as in Cooter and Porat's
example, "the probability of liability equals the probability of an accident caused by the doctor's
omitted care," then analogically to Cooter's and Polinsky and Shavell's suggestion for cases where
there is a positive probability that injurers escape liability, courts should use multipliers to correct
under-deterrence where the probability of liability is lower than one. Id. at 250; see also Cooter,
supra note 54; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 55. For presentation of their arguments, see supra
notes 53-56 and accompanying text. Thus, the estimated DA should be $10,000 ((1/0. 1)1, 000) and
the DoP criterion should lead to compensation of $5,000 ((1/0.1)500). Therefore, a DDA of $200
((1/0.1)20) creates severe under-deterrence.
165 Daniel Friedmann, Restitution for Wrongs: The Measure of Recovery, 79 TEx. L. REv. 1879
(2001).
166 Id. at 1910.
167 Id. at 1923-25. For further discussion of Friedmann's alternative suggestions for
determining disgorgement, see infra Section V.G.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 589 (2001).
For further discussion of Dagan and Heller's alternative suggestions for determining disgorgement,
see infra Section V.G.
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C. The Golden Rule (GR) of Compensation: The Example of Patent
Litigation
I argue above 7' that the reasonable royalty criterion-the most common
in patent litigation-reflects the GR criterion and that both are theoretically
equivalent. Patent litigation literature widely uses law and economics
methodology and broadly perceives this criterion as an efficient remedy, because
it mimics free negotiation between the parties and represents "market price" or
"market value." 172
The debate over applying the reasonable royalty criterion involves its
retrospective nature. The literature discusses how to apply the Georgia-Pacific
test to determine reasonable royalty-to mimic the bargaining that should have
been performed before the infringement-without future information.
73
Conversely, the literature claims that using prior license agreements between
PAEs and other parties might discourage PAEs from contracting potential low-
rate agreements and invite strategic patentee behavior designed to increase future
compensation, leading to shrinking markets and deadweight loss. Therefore,
calculating damages on an ad-hoc basis is preferable. 174 Another call is for courts
to determine the hypothetical bargaining outcome by ex-ante parameters, thus
avoiding deadweight loss, although calculating it using all relevant information,
including post-infringement data. '
Furthermore, I argue176 that the lost profits criterion-used where the
patentee is a manufacturer, would have sold products in the absence of
infringement, and can prove his losses (typically where the infringer uses a
171 See supra Section I.C.
172 For hypothetical bargaining as an efficient outcome and the value the parties would have
agreed to as the "market price" or "market value," see, for example, Lemley, supra note 99, at
661-69; Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement
Deterrent, 74 Mo. L. REv. 909, 920 (2009); and Melamed, supra note 107, at 61-63. Lee and
Melamed acknowledged the efficiency of the reasonable royalty criterion but claimed adjustments
are necessary. For example, in cases of innocent infringers, the remedy should be mitigated to
correct the locked-in effect of the infringer who pays excessive royalties due to the costs of his
dependence on the patent technology, as well as to correct the abuse of ex-post factors in
determining the outcome of ex-ante hypothetical bargaining. Lee & Melamed, supra note 99, at
392-93,413-27.
173 For arguments in favor of using ex-ante information and correcting the biasing influence of
the necessary use of ex-post information, see, for example, Cotter, Reining in Remedies, supra note
92, at 13-14 (calling not to take into account the change in plaintiffs bargaining power following
a judgment declaring the infringement of her right when determining reasonable royalty); Lee &
Melamed, supra note 99, at 392-93, 413-27; and Melamed, supra note 107, at 61-63.
174 See Hovenkamp & Masur, supra note 102, at 383.
175 See Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, A New Framework for Determining
Reasonable Royalties in Patent Litigation, 68 FLA. L. REv. 929, 929 (2016).
176 See supra Section I.C.
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competitor's patent)-may be perceived as applying the GR criterion, at least in
the common cases subject to the lost profits criterion, where the patentee's costs
exceed the infringer's profits. The literature on patent litigation usually considers
the lost profits criterion suitable for cases of manufacturers losing market share
due to patent infringement, seeing the manufacturer who owns a patent as
entitled to exclusivity in the product market, as derived from her legal right. 177
Gordon analyzed intellectual property law from the corrective justice
perspective"' and suggested adopting the unjust enrichment foundations of
intellectual property case law:
[T]he Supreme Court in dicta has defended state intellectual
property law by pointing to an "unjust enrichment" rationale. The
Court suggested that it can be a sufficient basis for requiring
payment that the defendant had the use of "some aspect of the
plaintiff' that had "market value" and for which the defendant
normally would pay. 17
9
Restitutionary remedies of intellectual property law should be limited,
however, by a set of minimum constraints suitable for cases involving "reaping"
another's intangible. 8 0 For example, a requirement that the wrongdoer
"knowingly copies an eligible intangible," ' or cases of "asymmetrical market
failure" 8 -2 "in which the plaintiff, but not the defendant, faced barriers
precluding use of the market."' 3 This theory also justifies the reasonable royalty
criterion from corrective justice perspective. 18 4
In response, Coleman argued"8 5 that
[i]f the entitlement is relevant to the cause of action, then perhaps
compensation is for the wrong done and for the loss that wrong
creates rather than for the benefit secured. Is it the harm done or
the benefit secured that is the basis of the claim to repair? If the
177 See, e.g., Cotter, Patent Remedies, supra note 99; Lee & Melamed, supra note 99, at 394-
95, 453-56; Lemley, supra note 99, at 657-61; Ryan, supra note 95, at 174-78.
178 Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 178 96 (1992).
179 Id at 183.
IS0 Id at 222-26.
181 Id. at 222.
182 Id. at 230.
183 Id.
184 See id. at 230, 231 n.318 and accompanying text.
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former, tort may be the appropriate model; if the latter, restitution
may be. The relevance of the entitlement suggests the tort model,
and nothing Professor Gordon says, including her hypothetical
bargaining approach, convinces me of the appropriateness of the
restitution model. After all, as economists have reminded us time
and again, tort law also can be modeled in hypothetical contract
terms. 86
In this article, my claim is that the GR criterion is the proper
compensation scheme for all civil wrongs, applying law and economics theories
and normative theories of corrective and distributive justice. A key justification
for the GR criterion is that members of society have the right to sell their rights
or entitlements by themselves, and the GR criterion is the only remedy that
precisely compensates them for the value of their taken entitlements. Next, I
present complete justifications for the GR criterion.
IV. JUSTWFICATIONS FOR THE GOLDEN RULE (GR) OF COMPENSATION-
A. Law and Economics Justifications
1. Bargaining Settings
i. The Right to Sell Your Right in Bargaining Settings
As described above, during their professional or personal activities,
individuals, including firms, impose risks on other members of society. In this
section, I assume they act non-willingly, albeit wrongfully. Potential wrongdoers
and victims know the expected value of the infringer's profits (Eo(V)) and the
expected value of the harm (Eo(D)). When the former act, the actual harm to the
victims and their profits materializes. Under the GR criterion, the wrongdoer
pays the victim her actual damages plus half the additional ANP' 8 7 derived from
the taking ( A(D I+ V1)) and estimates in advance that he would have to pay their
expected value { /2(Eo(D)+Eo(V))} . 188
196 Id. at 292.
187 For an explanation of the term ANP and its measurement criteria, see infra Section V.A.
188 For a numerical example demonstrating the compensation calculation under DA, DoP, and
GR criteria, see Example 1, supra Part I.
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Eo(D) J = /(Eo(D)+Eo(V))
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Figure 1: The Realization of Victim's Damages and Infringer's Profits from a Taking
Above, I claimed that in patent litigation between manufacturers and
PAEs, the hypothetical bargaining criterion ex-ante reflects the GR criterion and
both are theoretically equivalent.'89 Furthermore, in the literature, the
hypothetical bargaining criterion is widely perceived as an efficient remedy.' 90
My claim is that in all fields of civil law, the division of the added value
after the taking according to the GR criterion (point A in Figure 1) leads the
parties to act ex-ante based on the expected value of the actual payment to the
victim subject to the GR (point J), which is theoretically equivalent to the
hypothetical bargaining criterion. Those ex-post and ex-ante payments reflect
the same equilibrium. According to the two main approaches to solving bilateral
bargaining games, the outcome where the parties divide the expected bargaining
pie is the only solution for the ex-ante bargaining (if it was performed). Basically,
the concept of free agreements between parties as a main tool for Pareto-efficient
transfer of rights-meaning that at least one of the parties' utility increases and
no one's is reduced' 91-is fundamental in contract and property law. Free
transfers enable a flow of resources to the individuals or firms that value them
most and use them optimally for the benefit of society.'92 Moreover, among all
possible Pareto-efficient allocations of profits from the taking, the expected
payment to the victim (point J) is the only focal point of the ex-ante bargaining
game, a convention that may support a possible Nash equilibrium of the
bargaining.' 93 Another approach to solving bilateral bargaining is Rubinstein's
189 See supra Section II.C. and especially the text accompanying notes 106-109.
190 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
191 For the Pareto-efficiency criterion see, for example, COOTER & ULEN, supra note 49, at 13-
14; DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 153-55 (1990); ROBERT S. PINDYCK
& DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 602 (8th ed. 2013); POSNER, supra note 49, at 13-17;
HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICs: A MODERN APPROACH 310, 310-13 (9th ed.
2014); and Arlen, Tort Damages, supra note 39, at 683.
192 For the efficiency of exchange of rights and the role of contract and property law in
supporting this process, see, for example, POSNER, supra note 49, at 39 55, 95-105; and COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 49, at 70-94, 277-82.
193 For the focal point as an equilibrium in bargaining games, see KREPS, supra note 191, at
554-56; ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION- AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 32-33
(4th ed. 2007). For experiments that demonstrate the existence of equal sharing equilibrium, see
34
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alternating offers model, by which the expected payment to the victim is the only
Nash equilibrium.' 94 Notably, both solutions require the normative assumption
that the parties have identical characteristics.
I showed that the outcomes of the GR criterion and ex-ante hypothetical
bargaining are equal, and that it is the only solution for the bargaining game of
dividing taking's added benefits and harms. With an addition of a negligible sum
to the victim's DA, the latter is a possible outcome of hypothetical bargaining
(with all bargaining power unilaterally allocated to the potential injurer).' 95 It
does not lead, however, to equilibrium. The same applies to the DoP criterion
(with all bargaining power unilaterally allocated to the potential victim).
Next, I examine the effect of the competing criteria, DA, DoP and GR,
on the efficiency of takings. If the law's purpose is to enable commercial and
private acts so long as they are efficient, then DoP is inappropriate because it
actually bans all the commercial and private wrongful acts by eliminating all
added value from any taking. The DA criterion allows the act, which is also
wrongful, with all added value going to the infringer, and the GR allows the act
but divides the added value between the parties. I claim that in a bargaining
setting, the GR is the unique socially optimal rule of compensation for all civil
wrongs.
The GR is the only division of added value from the taking that gives
the victim full value for her right to sell her right by herself. The bundle-of-rights
approach to ownership in assets 96 perceives the right of disposition or alienation
as an essential element. 197 It is recognized by law in the context of property rights
and intellectual property.'98 My claim is that this right to transfer rights should
Alvin E. Roth & Francoise Schoumaker, Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An
Experimental Study, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 362 (1983). For similar results, see Judith Mehta et al.,
An Experimental Investigation of Focal Points in Coordination and Bargaining: Some Preliminary
Results, in DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK AND UNCERTAINTY: NEW MODELS AND EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS 211 (John Geweke ed., 1992). For an evaluation of those experiments, see COLIN F.
CAM ERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION 156-57 (2011);
and KREPS, supra note 191, at 554-56.
194 Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982).
For an explanation of Rubinstein's solution for bargaining games, see KREPS, supra note 191, at
556-65; and Rasmusen, supra note 193, at 361-65. For experimental evidence regarding
alternating offers, see KREPS, supra note 191, at 565-68.
195 For the terms under which the DA criterion is Pareto-Efficient, see, for example, Arlen, Tort
Damages, supra note 39, at 684-86.
196 For the bundle-of-rights approach to defining asset ownership and its importance in property
law theory, see, for example, Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L.
REV. 247 (2007); and James E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights " Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 711 (1996).
197 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 196, at 250, 254; Penner, supra note 196, at 734, 749.
198 See, e.g., Lior Zemer, What Copyright Is: Time to Remember the Basics, 4 BUFF. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 54, 75-77 (2007).
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be protected in all takings. The concept of potential victims' ownership of their
entitlements should not be narrowed to property rights and intellectual property.
Individuals usually exercise the power to transfer entitlements, for example, in
taking risks by consenting to elective operations. Hence, its elimination by law,
granting victims only their DA, undermines individuals' understanding of the
economic value of their entitlements (even if not recognized formally as property
rights).
An extensive literature explored the importance of property rights in
assets, including law and economics theories justifying property rights as an
essential tool for, inter alia, creating incentives to manufacture and maintain
assets; solving problems of common goods; creating incentives to transfer goods
by agreements leading to numerous Pareto-efficient improvements; offering an
alternative to physical guarding; and hedging against risks.1 99 Other theories
justify property rights as protecting assets created by their owner's labor and
effort,"° and as a means for developing an individual's personality."' 1
The DA criterion fully eliminates the right of disposition in any wrongful
taking and therefore undermines the purpose and value of ownership, whether of
property, intellectual property, quasi-property, or individual right. Specially, it
mitigates incentives to create and maintain assets that might be accidentally
harmed, imposes a burden of too high a level of physical guarding, undermines
the notion of free transfer's efficiency and removes the hedging value of the
right. Conversely, the GR criterion fully promotes those purposes and protects
the maximum value of the right of disposition included in the property rights
bundle or the concept of ownership in any asset, and therefore is socially
desirable. Notably, the taker equally shares the additional ANP with the victim:
the victim's share is the value of her right of disposition and the remaining at the
same amount is the taker's honest share of the additional value he initiates.
199 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 49, at 39-94; Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015 (2008); COOTER & ULEN,
supra note 49, at 70-186; Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347 (1967); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244 (1968).
200 For Locke's labor theory of property, justifying property rights based on their owner's
investment of efforts in natural resources, see John Locke, Second Treatise of Government §25, in
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 203 (1690). For possible criticism of Locke's labor theory of
property, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 174-78 (1974).
201 For Radin's personhood theory of property, see Margaret J. Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
[Vol. 121
36
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss1/8
ONE RULE TO COMPENSATE THEM ALL
ii. The Golden Rule (GR) is the Best Rule to Overcome
Under-Enforcement, Legal Criteria of Proving Damages,
Litigation Biases and Court Errors
The literature explores many reasons for under-compensation. One
reason is victims are not always informed that a taking occurred, that the taking
is wrongful, and that they have legal rights; or victims hesitate to sue for other
reasons.2 °2 As mentioned above,2 °3 the same under-compensation effect might
occur due to legal criteria of proving damages, such as non-recognition of
emotional harm caused to the victim's family; and due to measurement
problems, such as conservative measurement methods and difficulties
calculating noneconomic losses, particularly in cases of death and bodily injury.
While the DA criterion is highly sensitive to under-compensation and
leads to too many inefficient takings, the GR criterion is located in the middle of
the bargaining gap and is therefore the least sensitive point for both under- or
over-compensation. Under DA, under-compensation leads to inefficient takings
that GR would at least mitigate. Where there is under-compensation that does
not lead to awards lower than actual DA (erasing the victim's share in the added
value from the taking), the DA criterion leads to too many takings, many of them
inefficient. In those cases, the GR as the reference point for total biases ensures
that only efficient takings occur.
Often, the cumulative effect of biases from "pure" or accurate
compensation measurement (by the DA or GR criterion) is unclear. As
mentioned above, under-compensation is common in tort litigation."° In other
fields, however, measurement methods might cause over-compensation.
Furthermore, litigation biases might lead to unknown deviation from the legal
criterion. An extensive literature discusses reasons for takers and victims to agree
in settlement before and during trial to payments different from the actual
damages (assuming courts rule DA). These reasons include litigation costs;2 5
information asymmetry between takers and victims; 20 6 uncertainty as to the
202 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
205 See Bebchuk, A New Theory, supra note 128.
206 See Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract, supra note 129; Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H.
Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006); Avery W. Katz, The
Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990);
Alon Klement, Threats to Sue and Cost Divisibility under Asymmetric Information, 23 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 261 (2003).
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ruling that might lead a risk-averse victim to compromise with a less risk-averse
injurer;207 and parties' different subjective discount rates. 218
Court errors might have the same effect. Kaplow and Shavell argued that
if a risk-neutral potential taker expects court's DA assessment to be correct on
average, his taking decision is expected to be efficient .2 9 However, as indicated
above, there are many reasons for biased deviations, and lawyers from both sides
are expected to be able to evaluate both before the taking and during litigation
the cumulative effect of biases in each field, category of cases and specific
parameters of the case. Under DA, if the cumulative result is under-
compensation many inefficient takings might occur. The GR criterion optimally
mitigates this phenomenon.
2. Competitive Settings and Thin Markets
Where a market for potential victims' entitlements exists, even a "thin
market," government intervention is crucial for its existence. Without
government intervention that protects victims' entitlements, potential takers
would take entitlements by wrongful acts at no cost, and in turn, the entitlement
markets would collapse or at least operate with major distortions. The
government protects entitlement markets by establishing and maintaining a legal
system that forces wrongdoers to pay compensation.
My claim is that government efforts notwithstanding, restoring
entitlement markets is subject to the ability of the selected criterion to serve that
purpose. The DA criterion usually directs takers to pay the victim's costs. In turn,
the law forces perfect price discrimination of entitlement suppliers by forcing
them to waive their entitlement at its costs, leaving them nothing from their
potential profits from a possible transaction. Perfect price discrimination in
product markets is usually attributed to a monopoly that has the marketing
technology to set the price for each consumer individually at the highest possible
level, taking all consumer surplus.210 In the case of DA as a compensation
scheme in wrongful entitlement takings markets, the law allows the entitlement
207 See, e.g., Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards,
2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986).
208 Osnat Jacobi & Avi Weiss, The Effect of Time on Default Remedies for Breach of Contract,
35 INT'LREv. L. &ECON. 13 (2013).
209 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 131.
210 For an economic explanation of perfect (or first-degree) price discrimination, the conditions
for its existence, and its market effects, see, for example, GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DisCIRItNATION (2d ed. 1977); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 191, at 401-10; JEAN TfROLE,
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 52-133 (1988); VARIAN, supra note 191, at 481 87;
V Bhaskar & Ted To, Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? An Analysis of Free Entry,
35 RAND J. EcON. 762 (2004); and Meghan Busse & Marc Rysman, Competition and Price
Discrimination in Yellow Pages Advertising, 36 RAND J. ECON. 378 (2005).
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buyer to take it without bargaining at the price of the victim's damages and
without any need to share profits, and therefore categorically dictates perfect
price discrimination of entitlement suppliers.
DA leads potential wrongdoers to take each entitlement where the
expected profits from the taking are higher than the expected costs of the
entitlement. This leads to too many takings compared to a competitive market




A F QE QE2 Entitlement
Quantity
Figure 2: Supply and demand
entitlement takings market
in the wrongful
If an entitlement market is competitive, the buyers see a market price
(PEI in Figure 2), act accordingly and purchase entitlements at the efficient
quantity (QE,). However, with perfect price discrimination in the wrongful
entitlement takings market, a price is not available and many entitlement
transfers are performed below the artificial market price, at a price identical to
the entitlements' costs (below PEI). Moreover, many potential wrongdoers may
reconsider entitlement transfers performed above the artificial market price
(above PEI). Cumulatively, the wrongdoers purchase entitlements at different
prices with a total quantity higher than the efficient level (QE2> QEI).
According to welfare economics, inefficiency in commodity markets
leads to inefficiency in product markets that use those commodities for
manufacturing. 21 1 Similarly, those distortions in wrongful entitlement takings
211 This outcome derives from the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, stating that
a set of competitive markets leads to an efficient allocation of resources. For economic definition
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markets might affect other markets as well. If takers use entitlements
inefficiently and consume them at a higher than optimal level, then they are
expected to produce inefficiently in the markets where those entitlements serve
as commodities.
If the law considers entitlement costs as a criterion for compensation,
manufacturers might decide to pay suppliers costs and save search costs by
forcing inefficient takings, for example, of rights to clean air, to safe working
environment and of intellectual property rights. The GR criterion may restore the
wrongful entitlement takings markets. By forcing a hypothetical market price
that ensures the victim's entitlement costs and further divides the added profits
from the taking, it optimally mimics the operation of free and competitive
markets. Simultaneously, the GR offers both potential takers and entitlement
owners their normal profits from the taking and ensures efficient takings and just
division of profits from each transaction in entitlement markets, and in turn,
efficient allocation of resources.212
Notably, where a taker wrongfully acts and a victim's entitlement is
taken, under certain conditions, a compensation scheme that forces the taker to
pay the entitlement market price may be an optimal remedy. The conditions are
as follows: (1) the entitlement is by itself a product traded in a fully competitive
market, meaning a market with a unified product and perfect information; 213 and
(2) the product is a perfect substitute for the taken entitlement (that the victim is
able to adjust to her operation at the infringer's expense). My claim is that if
those conditions are met, the payment reflects a "real" market price and therefore
the GR criterion.214
3. Behavioral Economic Considerations
Risks estimation is crucial for all human behaviors, private or
commercial. Its importance rapidly grows, since in modem life, the cycle of
technology changes is becoming rapidly shorter. Cognitive psychology shows
that risk estimation is biased due to mechanisms such as the availability
and explanation, see, for example, COOTER & ULEN, supra note 49, at 37-38; KREPs, supra note
191, at 199-200 (1990); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 191, at 595 615; and VARIAN, supra
note 191, at 604-12.
212 For further discussion of tortious examples as examples for the superiority of the GR
criterion, see Sher, supra note 25.
213 For economic definition, conditions and analysis of competitive markets, see, for example,
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 49, at 28-29; KREPS, supra note 191, at 187-92; PINDYCK &
RUBINFELD,supra note 191, at 317-28; and VARLAN, supra note 191, at 292-95.
214 For further discussion of the conditions for using the entitlement's "market price" as a
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heuristic,21 5 a cognitive mechanism that enables individuals to assess
probabilities of event occurrences by the speed they can draw them from
memory. For example, this mechanism might cause managers to underestimate
the risks of occupational injuries. Research identified other cognitive biases that
might cause individuals to underestimate probabilities of negative events, even
where accurate and objective information is available, including over-
optimism216 and overconfidence that lead individuals to overestimate the validity
of the information they receive and the accuracy of their assessments.2" 7 Small
probabilities might be completely ignored (no-risk bias)2 18 as can small
differences between probabilities (insensitiveness).2 19 All those phenomena
might lead to underestimation of risks and to too many wrongful takings, many
of them inefficient.22 °
With technology rapidly changing, it is important to find efficient
debiasing mechanisms. However, findings show that motivated reasoning biases
such as confirmation bias cause individuals to ignore incoming negative
information and interpret it in a way that confirms their erroneous
prejudgment,22 1 and that designing legal debiasing mechanisms is an elusive
task.222
215 The availability heuristic was first introduced in Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 ScI. 1124, 1127-28 (1974). For its effect
on individual judgment, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 168-208
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). See also Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The
Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of
Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103 19
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
216 For a review of the literature on over-optimism and its effects on legal issues, see Sean
Hannon Williams, Probability Errors: Overoptimism, Ambiguity Aversion, and the Certainty
Effect, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 335, 335 53 (Eyal
Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014).
217 For overconfidence, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra
note 215, at 287-353.
218 See Jonathan Baron et al., Attitudes Toward Managing Hazardous Waste: What Should Be
Cleaned Up and Who Should Pay for It, 13 RiSK ANALYSIS 183 (1993); see also Barbara Luppi &
Francesco Parisi, Behavioral Models in Tort Law, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS (Joshua Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler eds., 2013).
219 See Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications for Tort
and Contract Law, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 125 (2003).
220 For further discussion of behavioral economic arguments for the superiority of the GR
criterion, see Sher, supra note 25.
221 See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 215, at 339;
Margit E. Oswald & Stefan Grosjean, Confirmation Bias, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK
ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 79 (Rtidiger F. Pohl ed., 2004).
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My claim is that the DA criterion is not an efficient debiasing
mechanism. In everyday individual and corporate life, wrongdoers perform
takings, often without any negative effect and especially without damages.
Often, the wrongdoing remains unknown. This common occurrence is a moral
luck problem.2 3 The DA criterion prevents victims from suing the takers and
does not provide incentives for victims to invest in revealing the facts. Therefore,
due to this failure of law to compensate, individuals and firm managers
constantly learn to err.
Where technology changes, and managers and individuals react by
estimating risks in new settings, the GR criterion may serve as an effective
debiasing mechanism. The GR gives numerous victims of minor wrongful
takings with small damages an incentive to sue, and thereby makes all members
of society agents for discovering errors in takers' risk assessments in a timely
manner. If, for example, workers have proper incentives to sue when a new
technology is adopted and managers underestimate risks, suboptimal safety
measures are taken, and accidents happen with negligible and minor damages-
the error may be discovered and corrected in time, before a fatal accident occurs.
Out of all possible allocations of the added value from the taking, from
giving the victim her damages to giving her damages plus all the added value
from the taking, the GR criterion is the only acceptable alternative that can serve
as a debiasing mechanism because it is the only criterion based on individuals'
conception of fairness. Notably, experiments that questioned criteria of sharing





In this Section, I claim that that normative theories of both corrective
and distributive justice lead to the same unique socially optimal GR
compensation criterion. Elsewhere,225 I claimed that the GR is a unique criterion
for courts and juries to determine the proper pecuniary remedy for tortious cases,
supported by legal and economic as well as normative theories, including
223 For an introduction to the moral luck problem, see THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS
24-38 (1979); Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 57 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 20-39 (1981); and Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL
LUCK 35 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993). For moral luck in tort law, see John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 1123 (2007); and
Christopher Jackson, Tort, Moral Luck, and Blame, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 57 (2012).
224 See references supra notes 193-194.
225 See Sher, supra note 25.
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corrective and distributive justice. Next, I argue that corrective justice 226
supports the uniqueness of the GR as a criterion for compensation for all civil
wrongs.
As mentioned above,227 the perception of wrongs as takings is suitable
for modem commercial and private activities, where a firm or individual hope to
gain and their activities impose risks to potential victims. This description
applies to all civil wrongs, and is suitable for analysis informed by normative
theories going back to Aristotle. It is consistent with Aristotle's notion of
corrective justice that focuses on correcting wrongs by eliminating the
infringer's wrongful gains and the correlative losses caused to the victim.
2 28
The literature discusses corrective justice justifications for many fields
of law,229 including tort,23° intellectual property,23' unjust enrichment,232 and
property law.233 In all, wrongful taking basically means that where a wrong leads
correlatively to infringer's gains and victim's losses, the taker should correct the
226 For corrective justice theories, see, for example, Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and Tort
Theory: Preliminary Reflections on Method, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 183 (Gerald
J. Postema ed., 2001) [hereinafter Coleman, Tort Law and Tort Theory]; Jules L. Coleman, The
Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 427 (1992); Jules L. Coleman, The
Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 15 (1995); George Fletcher, Corrective Justice for
Moderns, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1658-78 (1993); Stephen Perry, The Moral Foundations of
Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992); Weinrib, Emerging Consensus, supra note 2; and Ernest
J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002).
227 See supra Part I.
228 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
229 For the broad range of corrective justice theories' effects, see, for example, Ernest J.
Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403,425 (1992); and Weinrib, The Gains andLosses,
supra note 29, at 277-78.
230 For justifications of tort law based on corrective justice theories, see, for example, Coleman,
Tort Law and Tort Theory, supra note 226; PETER M. GERHART, TORT LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY
(20 10); Perry, supra note 226; and Weinrib, Emerging Consensus, supra note 2.
231 For justifications of intellectual property rights and protection based on corrective justice
theories, see, for example, Stephen R. Munzer, Corrective Justice and Intellectual Property Rights
in Traditional Knowledge, in NEW FRONTIERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 58
(Annabelle Lever, ed., 2012); and Jules L. Coleman, Intellectual Property and Corrective Justice,
78 VA. L. REV. 283 (1992).
232 For justifications of unjust enrichment law based on corrective justice theories, see, for
example, DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 15, at 171-72; Emily Sherwin, Restitution and
Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083,2104-08 (2001);
and Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages, supra note 80, at 1.
233 For justifications of property law based on corrective justice theories, see, for example,
PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY (2014); Eric R. Claeys, On Corrective
Justice and Rights in Property: A Comment on Property Law and Social Morality, 2 TEX. A&M J.
REAL PROP. 205 (2015); and Gordley, supra note 80.
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wrong by compensating the victim.23 4 As mentioned above, modem theorists
explained that since the injurer's gains and victim's losses are not necessarily
identical, Aristotle's explanation evokes a puzzle.235
Scholars have dealt with the question of how to solve Aristotle's puzzle.
Weinrib proposed, 36 in context of torts and unjust enrichment, a distinction
between material and normative gains and losses:
One possibility is that gain and loss are variants from each
litigant's antecedent resources. We may call this the 'material'
conception of gain and loss, because it focuses on the extent to
which the litigant is materially better or worse off than before
the wrong .... In its material aspect, a gain is an increase in a
party's resources; a loss is a decrease.
A second possibility is what we may call the 'normative'
conception of gain and loss. Under this conception, gains and
losses refer to discrepancies between what the parties have and
what they should have according to the norm governing their
interaction. The baseline for normative gains and losses is one's
due under the relevant norm. A gain is an excess over, and a loss
a shortfall from, one's due.2 37
Weinrib argued that Aristotle perceived the gains and losses of
corrective justice as normative.2 38
And what is the role of material damages, if any? After the wrongdoing
has occurred, Weinrib explained,2 39 the victim's actual losses must be measured
to enforce their correction. 4 ° Furthermore, this is also the role of material gains
in the context of unjust enrichment. 241
234 This relation between the outcome to the victim and the harm caused by the injurer is known
as "the correlativity principle." See, e.g., Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, supra note
226, at 26-29; Weinrib, Emerging Consensus, supra note 2, at 110-12, 116-19.
235 Weinrib, The Gains and Losses, supra note 29, at 277 79.
236 Id. at 282-86.
237 Id. at 282-83.
238 Id. at 286-89.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 288.
241 Id. at 289. In another article, Weinrib discussed the concept of normative gains and losses
in the context of unjust enrichment. See Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages, supra note 80. Weinrib
explained that the normative conception of the goal of corrective justice may justify disgorgement
in proper cases "when the potential for gain is an incident of the right that the wrongdoer violated."
Id. at 37. For criticism, see Dagan, supra note 80; and Gordley, supra note 80. For situations where
it is appropriate to apply the criterion of full disgorgement, see infra Section V.G.
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Hershovitz argued z42 that Weinrib's distinction and emphasis on
normative gains and losses to explain the basis for tort liability is circular:
On Weinrib's picture, corrective justice calls for undoing
normative gains and losses. What are the normative gains? They
are the gains that corrective justice requires that we undo.
Weinrib is attempting to solve the problem of the missing gain
by fiat. Corrective justice itself creates the gain needed to offset
the victim's loss.
2 4 3
Furthermore, Hershovitz claimed Weinrib did not explain how losses
could be corrected.244
I argue that Weinrib's coherent theory relies on the assumption that in
torts, after correcting the wrong by paying the victim her damages, the tortfeasor
may gain all the added value from his action. Furthermore, in unjust enrichment
cases, the wrongdoer is obliged to pay only his profits, even if they are lower
than the victim's damages. My idea is that those corrections to wrongdoings are
insufficient in term of corrective justice.245
The main element of the GR is that in cases of wrongs with taker's
profits higher than victim's damages, in all civil wrongs, the GR allows the
victim her damages plus her share in the added value from the taking. This
amount is the precise value of her infringed right that includes the value of her
right to sell her right by herself, namely her right of disposition. Furthermore, in
those cases, correcting wrongs using the GR allows the taker his honest share of
the taking-the added value from the taking created by his efforts. In my basic
242 Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
107, 113-17 (2011).
243 Id. at 114.
244 Id. Alternatively, Hershovitz argued that understanding tort law goals should be based on
Goldberg and Zipursky's Civil Recourse Theory, which he claims is actually a corrective justice
theory. Id. at 117-26. This theory views the tort system as a civil resources mechanism whereby
the state has to provide victims with the tools for recovery by placing them in a state as similar as
possible to where they could have been if not for the misfortunate interaction with the injurer. Id.
For the Civil Recourse Theory, see John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized
Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1643 (2002); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in
the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 82 (1998); and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not
Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 709-13 (2003). Zipursky explains, however, that his is not a
corrective justice theory, inter alia, since the tort system also offers remedies such as punitive
damages, which do not have corrective characters. For criticism of the theory's arguments against
traditional corrective justice theories and for possible answers, see Erik Encamacion, Corrective
Justice as Making Amends, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 451 (2014). For further discussion of Hershovitz's
claims against Weinrib, see Sher, supra note 25.
245 My argument for the superiority of GR applies also to Hershovitz's suggestion to understand
tort law goals based on the Civil Resources Theory, whereby the state has to provide victims with
tools for recovery. For Hershovitz's suggestion, see Hershovitz, supra note 242.
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example, 246 the gap between taker's profits of $1,000 and victim's damages of
$600 demonstrates Aristotle's puzzle-a compensation that equals the profit
gives the victim all the added value from the taking, including that part created
by the taker's efforts, while DA gives the taker all the added value from the
taking and does not eliminate his revenues from wrongdoing. Under the GR
criterion, the taker pays the victim $800 (600+ A(1,000-600)), and the victim
receives her damages of $600 and her part of the added value from the taking to
equal $200 ( (1,000-600)). The latter is the value of her right to sell her
entitlement that has materialized at the time of the taking. The taker pays the true
value of the victim's entitlement and receives that part of the added value from
the taking of $200 (1,000-800) that was created solely by his efforts.
This solution to Aristotle's puzzle is valid even where the victim
suffered only negligible damages. In this case, the parties share their luck that
creates the highest value to each of them: the taker pays the victim $500
(0+ (1,000-0)) and gains $500 (1,000-500).247
The third component of the GR is that if the firm loses after paying the
victim her damages-for example, where the total profits are $400 (before
paying the victim's damages)-the taker pays the victim only her damages of
$600.248 Because the realization of profits and damages has not created any
added value, the value of the right to transfer this entitlement is zero, and the
victim is not entitled to any added value beyond her damages. The wrongdoer's
losses of $200 were caused by his misjudgment and rush to impose risk on
another individual, and it is therefore justifiable for him to bear all the losses.
Above, I claimed that in patent litigation, the hypothetical bargaining
criterion precisely reflects the GR criterion.2 49 Furthermore, it is commonly
applied in cases where the patent owner is not a manufacturer and is unable to
prove her losses.2 5 ° Thus, this criterion serves as a measurement tool to calculate
the value of the intellectual property right, including its owner's right to sell it
by herself. As explained above, applying this measurement tool is theoretically
equivalent to measuring the outcome by paying the victim her damages plus half
the additional ANP derived from the infringement. 21 Therefore, in light of
Gordon and Coleman's discussion,"' my reply is that the hypothetical
bargaining criterion is the correct value of the infringed property right, without
considering restitutionary goals.
246 See Example 1.1, supra Section I.B.
247 See Example 1.2, supra Section I.B.
248 See Example 1.3, supra Section I.B.
249 See supra Section H.C.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 See supra notes 178 186 and accompanying text.
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2. Distributive Justice
For distributive justice theories reasoning, 25 3 1 apply Rawlsian25 4 criteria
of justice as fairness 255 to show that the GR is a unique criterion for courts and
juries to determine the proper pecuniary remedy for all civil wrongs.256 As
mentioned above,257 I describe wrongs as takings-in modern life, potential
wrongdoers are also manufactures of goods and providers of services who act to
increase their gains, and hopefully social welfare, and simultaneously impose
risks on others, and forcibly appropriate their entitlements. The GR fairly divides
the added value created by takings and therefore meets Rawls's criterion of the
hypothetical social contract, which states that a social arrangement is just if it is
adopted by rational and reasonable members of society.258 The GR meets this
criterion by allowing beneficial activities, both private and commercial, to take
place. And by dividing the gains of those activities, it promises a fair price to
potential takers and entitlement owners. Where gains exceed damages, DA
253 Distributive justice is a theory that aims to provide moral guidance for law, institutions, and
policies that affect the distribution of economic benefits and burdens in societies. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL ALLINGHAM, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 1-11 (2014); JOHN ARTHUR & WILLIAM H. SHAW,
JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION 1 (1978); JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE 51-53 (1996).
254 Rawls's theories of distributive justice informed studies of legal arrangements. In tort law,
see, for example, Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996). Based on Rawlsian social contract theory, Keating developed a social
contract conception of due care. Id. at 312-13; see also Arthur Ripstein, Torts: The Division of
Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2004). Ripstein argued that "Rawls
offers us the basis of an account that enables us to understand the normative significance of ideas
about private wrongdoing and, more importantly, to locate that significance in relation to the ideas
of freedom and equality that more conspicuously animate A Theory of Justice." Id. at 1811-12.
For application of Rawlsian reasoning to support property law arrangements, see Joseph William
Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1009, 1043-44 (2009). In the intellectual property context, Merges, inter alia, relied on Rawls to
explain the foundation of intellectual property law. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 102-36 (2011); see also Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright
and Distributive Justice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513 (2016). For the limits of distributive justice
in explaining civil law, see Hanoch Dagan, Qualitative Judgments and Social Criticism in Private
Law: A Comment on Professor Keating, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES. L. 89 (2003).
255 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (197 1) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE];
see also JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
256 For my argument that, in torts, the GR criterion meets Rawlsian criteria ofjustice as fairness,
see Sher, supra note 25.
257 See supra Part I.
258 For the hypothetical social contract criterion of justice, see RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 255, at 10-15. For further explanation, see, for example, SAMUEL FREEMAN, JUSTICE
AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS ON RAWLSIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 17-44 (2007); and
THOMAS POGGE, JOHN RAWLS: HIS LIFE AND THEORY OF JUSTICE 60, 62, 64-65 (2007).
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encourages too many takings, and DoP bars takings that contribute to society,
without considering the true value of the forcibly purchased entitlements.
Furthermore, the GR best meets Rawls's criterion of veil of ignorance-
by which a social arrangement is just if individuals, who do not know their
position in advance, commit themselves to it as free and equal persons who
jointly agree to accept it.259 Individuals who do not know in advance whether
they would become takers or victims prefer an arrangement that considers both
possibilities. The DA criterion allows too many takings, imposes higher than
necessary risks on potential victims, and gives all added value from the risk-
imposing acts to the takers. Therefore, potential victims are not expected to
accept it. The DoP criterion bars contributory acts and gives all added value to
the victims and therefore is unacceptable by potential takers. For individuals who
do not know in advance whether they would become takers or victims, the GR
is the safest. Notably, risk-averse individuals who do not know their position in
advance strictly prefer the GR criterion.
Next, I turn to explore the implementation of the GR in specific
categories of cases, including possible ways to measure compensation by this
criterion, and reasons to shift to the DoP criterion or injunctions.
V. THE GOLDEN RULE (GR) CRITERION: IMPLEMENTATION RULES
A. Where Measurable Gains Exceed Measurable Damages
I argue above 26 0 that the GR compensation criterion should be applied
to all civil wrongs. Under the current civil law, there are fields where, to
compensate victims, courts and juries measure DA261 and others where they
measure gains. 262 In many cases or case categories, they measure both and apply
the higher. 263 In some cases or categories, determining profits is easier and more
accurate than measuring DA and vice versa. 26
The first component of the GR is that where the infringer's gains exceed
the victim's losses, the infringer should be obliged to pay the victim's damages
plus half of the additional ANP derived from the taking. In Example 1.1,265 the
259 For the veil of ignorance criterion of justice, see RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note
255, at 136-41. For further explanation, see, for example, FREEMAN, supra note 258, at 32-36; and
POGGE, supra note 258, at 64-67.
260 See supra Part IV.
261 See supra Section II.A.
262 See supra Section II.B.
263 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
264 See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 73, at 432-33.
265 See Example 1.1, supra Section I.B.
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profits are $1,000, the DA are $600, and the taker pays the victim $800 (600+
Y (1,000-600)).
Where the taker is a corporation, the parameters of its profits include
gross and net profits as presented in its financial statements.26 6 Other parameters,
such as salaries and value of immovable property and inventory, may be viable.
The most important are parameters that may be useful in measuring the
infringer's ANP.2 67 Example 2 demonstrates how the infringer's ANP should be
determined in common cases where the taker's gains are derived from the taking
but also from other sources, including the taker's work and property. Example 2.
Assume a fim increases its manufacturing with an added profit of $2,000, uses
commodities at a price of $600, pays $600 as salary to a worker, and acts
wrongfully by failing to install safety equipment; consequently, the worker or
someone else suffers damages of $600. Under the GR, the employee's
contribution could be calculated based on her salary relative to other costs that
are at the same amount ($600). Therefore, the infringer's ANP are $1000
600(6 x2, 000), and the compensation remains $800 (600+ /2(1,000-600)).268
Example 2 demonstrates the importance of using objective parameters'
such as salaries, which are not necessarily correlated with her damages that she
has to prove in court, to determine the victim's contribution. 269 Allegedly, in the
example, using DA ($600) would lead to the same victim's contribution (half of
the total profit of $1,000) and to the same compensation. Determining victim's
compensation based on DA, however, will dramatically expose the
compensation amount to court's errors.
To illustrate the importance of using objective parameters to measure
ANP, assume that in Example 1.1-where profits equal ANP-the profits are
determined correctly at $1,000. Furthermore, assume that in Example 2-based
on a 1:1 ratio between employee salary and employer costs-the infringer's ANP
266 See FRANK WOOD & ALAN SANGSTER, FRANK WOOD'S BUSINESS ACCOUNTING: VOL. 1,
187-89 (14th ed. 2018), for an accounting definition and calculation of gross and net profits.
267 This is analogical to the principle that "the unjust enrichment of a conscious wrongdoer...
is the net profit attributable to the underlying wrong." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4) (AM. LAW INST. 2011). "The object of restitution in such cases is to
eliminate profit from wrongdoing while avoiding, so far as possible, the imposition of a penalty."
Id. For a comprehensive explanation, under unjust enrichment principles, of the infringer's
contribution to his actual gains from wrongdoing-which is analogical to the ANP that I use to
measure the GR-and for related measurement criteria, see Friedmann, supra note 165, at 1887-
1903, 1923-25. Notably, in his research, Friedmann also presented another concept-attributed
gains-which are gains that never fully materialized. Id. at 1883-87, 1923-25.
268 GR = DA+(ANP-DA) = (DA+ANP).
269 For other examples demonstrating the importance of determining the taker's ANP based on
objective parameters that are not correlated with proven DA, see infra Section V.B--discussing
cases where damages are negligible-and Example 3, infra Section 1V.D--discussing cases where
determining damages is an elusive task.
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are determined at $1,000. If the court systematically estimates damages at 90%,
80%, or 70% of their true value, as is common in several case categories, such
as in determining noneconomic losses and in cases of death and serious bodily
injury, 270 then compensation under the GR criterion drops to $770, $740, or
$710, respectively (see Col. 3 in Table 1 below). This under-compensation is not
expected to be severe, as a low rate of measurement errors keeps compensation
above the DA level (of $600).
Proven DA Compensation in cases where the taker's
ANP are
(Col. 1 - %) (Col. 2 - $) fixed correlated with the
(Col. 3 - $) proven DA
(Col. 4 - $)
70 420 710 622
80 480 740 684
90 540 770 744
100 600 800 800
110 660 830 854
120 720 860 905
130 780 890 955
Table 1: Compensation under the GR criterion where the court errs in
determining DA
If in Example 2, however, the court uses proven DA to determine the
infringer's ANP, then if the court systematically estimates damages at 90%,
80%, or 70% of their true value, the infringer's ANP decreases accordingly.
Hence, compensation under the GR drops sharply to $744, $684, or $622,
respectively (see Col. 4 in Table 1 above). To conclude, this under-compensation
due to DA measurement errors is more severe where the court uses proven DA
to determine the infringer's ANP instead of objective parameters such as salaries.
The problem of measuring the relative contribution of the infringed
entitlement is common in patent litigation where courts apply the hypothetical
bargaining criterion, particularly with patents included in information
270 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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technology (IT) products.2 7' Lemley and Melamed explained that
especially in the IT industry, products commonly use
technologies claimed by thousands of patents. In principle,
patent damages could take account of the multiplicity of
technologies in a product and allocate value among them
accordingly, but that rarely happens. Practical or court-ordered
limits on the length of trials usually prevent a full exploration of
all the technologies and value contributors in a product. 272
They further explained that, in trial, the focus on the infringed patent
leads to overestimation of its relative value.2 73 Again, this problem may be
addressed by determining objective parameters such as salaries, investment in
R&D, or value of property and inventory in the taker's financial statements.
As discussed above, 7 4 in patent infringement litigation, in cases where
damages measured by the lost profits criterion are lower than the taker's profits,
the added value of the taking should be shared. Although it is not a common case
in patent infringement litigation, where taker's profits and patent owner's
damages are measurable with relative accuracy, and the first exceed the second,
applying the ex-post GR criterion should be considered.
B. Where Measurable Gains Exceed Negligible Damages
The second component of the GR is that where the infringer's gains
exceed the victim's losses, and these are negligible, the former still has to pay
the amount of the victim's damages plus half the additional ANP derived from
the taking. In Example 1.2,275 the profits are $1,000, the DA are negligible, and
therefore, under the GR, the taker pays the victim $500 (0+ 2(1,000-0)). In those
cases, determining the victim's contribution based on objective parameters (such
as salaries) that are not correlated with her proven damages is crucial. Otherwise,
the compensation would be negligible and would fail to achieve the GR point of
maximum social welfare.
As I discuss above,27 6 this component of the GR is crucial in order to
address common moral luck problems and errors in judgment due to cognitive
biases leading to risk underestimations underlying the law enforcement's
difficulties. This component of the GR requires, however, a major change in
271 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2143-44 (2013).
272 Id. at 2144.
273 Id.
274 See supra Section II.C.
275 See Example 1.2, supra Section I.B.
276 See supra Section IV.B.
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current law277 as well as the development of mechanisms aimed to balance its
advantages with its potential costs. For example, to avoid suits where the victim
files for compensation for past negligible damages with no actual future risks
that the infringer wrongfully imposes, the law may require the plaintiff to prove
meaningful risks to her and to others by the same continuous wrongdoing.
C. Where Measurable Damages Exceed Gains
The third component of the GR is that where the victim's losses exceed
taker's gains the taker should be obliged to pay the victim the amount of her
damages. In Example 1.3, the profits are $400, the victim suffers damages of
$600 that exceed the infringer's profits, and therefore, under the GR, the taker
pays the victim her damages ($600) and loses $200 (400-600).278 Notably, in
those cases, determining the victim's contribution based on objective parameters
(such as salaries) is still important, and over-estimation of the victim's
contribution to profits might lead to over-compensation. The amount of total
compensation, however, is more sensitive to errors in determining DA.
D. Where Measuring Damages or Gains is Elusive
As discussed above, in some cases or categories of cases, determining
profits is easier and more accurate than measuring DA, and vice versa.279 There
are also cases or categories where this task is elusive, such as determining
damages in tortious cases of noneconomic losses or for death and serious bodily
injury that usually lead to under-compensation.2 8 ° If measuring damages is
expected to be an elusive task, and determining the infringer's ANP is clear, then
it is possible to use the ANP data to calculate the compensation by the GR
criterion.
To do so, where the taker's ANP was calculated, and the victim suffers
lower damages, of which precise estimation is elusive, courts may apply the
NPM ratio, defined as the taker's net profits divided by his net sales.28 ' Example
3 demonstrates the GR criterion in cases where measuring damages or gains is
elusive. Example 3.1. Assume a firm increases its manufacturing acts wrongfully
by failing to install safety equipment, and consequently someone suffers
277 For the current law requiring damages as a common remedy, see supra Section II.A.
278 See Example 1.3, supra Section I.B.
279 See Hylton, supra note 73, at 432-33.
280 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
281 For NPM, see, for example, Michael Dewally & Yingying Shao, Industry Cluster and
Performance Sensitivity, 39 J. ECON. & FIN. 824 (2015); and Louis de Mesnard, Profit Margin
Ratio, Markup and Profit Margin Per Unit as Objectives for the Firm: An Economic Point-of- View
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damages. The infringer's ANP is $1,000 and measured at reasonable accuracy,
the DA are known to be less than $1,000, but are elusive; and the taker's NPM
ratio is 0.2 (20%). Based on the NPM ratio, the DA are estimated at $833.3
1 1,000), and under the GR criterion, the taker pays the victim $916.6 (1,000-
0.5(1,000--1 1,000)).282 This, without directly measuring DA in circumstances
where it is costly, inaccurate, and sometimes impossible.
The same rule applies in cases or categories of cases where determining
profits is an elusive task. Furthermore, if determining the taker's NPM ratio is
also difficult, courts may use the specific industry's net profits margin ratio to
calculate compensation. Example 3.2. Now assume that the proven damages are
$600 and are expected to be relatively accurate, that it is difficult to calculate the
taker's ANP, which is known to be higher than the proven damages, and that the
specific industry's NPM ratio is 0.2 (20%). Hence, under the GR criterion, the
taker pays the victim $660 (600+0.5(1.2x600-600)).2s3
E. Applying Hypothetical Bargaining Where Measuring Damages and
Gains is Elusive
For all civil wrongs, in cases where severe under- or over-compensation
is expected due to the court's inability to measure damages and gains and in turn
apply the ex-post GR criterion, including using NPM ratios, courts may use its
ex-ante equivalent, namely the hypothetical bargaining criterion-which is the
court's practical implication of the reasonable royalty criterion of patent
litigation.284 As described above,2 85 in patent infringement litigation, the lost
profits criterion of compensation applies only when strict requirements are met:
where the patentee is a manufacturer, would have sold products in the absence
of infringement, and is able to prove his losses; otherwise, the court determines
reasonable royalties by the hypothetical bargaining criterion. This criterion is
also applied in copyright infringement litigation.286 Likewise, in all typical civil
282 GR = DA+ (ANP-DA) = (DA+ANP) ANP-(' ((1-l+N )ANP = ((I+TP)ANP,
where DA = ANP
1+NPM
283 GR = DA+ (ANP-DA) = (DA+ANP) DA+( ((I+NPM)DA-DA)) = (I+ NPM)DA,
where ANP = (1 +NPM)DA.
284 For my claim that reasonable royalty is the most common compensation criterion in patent
litigation, that, in requiring the court to perform hypothetical bargaining between the infringer and
patent owner based mainly on ex-ante parameters, it reflects the GR criterion, and that, where the
hypothetical bargaining is performed between identical parties, they are theoretically equivalent,
see supra Section II.C.
285 See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
286 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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wrong cases, the terms for shifting from the ex-post to ex-ante bargaining
criterion should be determined.
The transfer from ex-post measuring of compensation by the GR
criterion to ex-ante hypothetical bargaining is not suitable for all case categories.
For example, it is not suitable for death and serious bodily injuries where the
insurance and welfare distribution aims of compensation are crucial. It is more
suitable to commercial disputes, especially where the taker wrongfully infringes
upon an entitlement that is similar in nature to a license. It may be suitable to
many workers or inhabitants suing a manufacturer who wrongfully imposes risks
to the working or city environment, albeit with small harm to each individual.
To apply the hypothetical bargaining criterion for all civil wrongs, courts
may develop a "book of wisdom" suitable to each category of cases-ex-ante
factors adjusted to each category, similar to the process of determining the
Georgia-Pacific 15-factor test of patent litigation.28 7 While some of those factors
aim to determine the value of a patent's license and usually are not directly
applicable outside intellectual property law,288 others may be adjusted for
different context. An example for the former may be Parameter 1 of Georgia-
Pacific: "[t]he royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent
in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty. 2z89 An example for
the latter may be Parameter 11: "[t]he extent to which the infringer has made use
of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use. ' 290 This
may be adjusted, mutatis mutandis, to infringement of an entitlement that is
dissimilar in nature to a license.
Notably, similar to the debate over using ex-post data to determine
hypothetical bargaining outcomes by ex-ante parameters,2 91 using post-
infringement data may be considered for the hypothetical bargaining "book of
wisdom" for all civil wrongs.
Another debate derived from the discussion of hypothetical bargaining
involves the question of the necessity of the parties' bargaining power parameter
and the way to apply it in determining reasonable royalty. Siebrasse and Cotter
argued2 92 that where parties' bargaining power has changed between the time of
the infringement and the trial, it is necessary to identify the particular source of
287 For the Georgia-Pacific 15-factor test, see supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
Bendix argued that, in calculating reasonable royalties in copyright law, courts may use the patent
law's Georgia-Pacific factors as a baseline and adjust them to copyright context. See Bendix, supra
note 119, at 547-57.
288 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modifying judgment, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 175 and accompanying text.
292 Id. at 988-90.
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that change to determine whether the royalty payment should be adjusted. They
claimed, for example, that an infringer should not be rewarded with a reduction
in reasonable royalty if the patentee suffered financial difficulties at the time of
the infringement and therefore had low bargaining power.293 Inter alia, they
suggested 94 that in VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,29 5 the court rejected the
common reliance of experts in their testimony on the Nash Bargaining Solution
as a model for reasonable royalty damages. The court held:
The Nash theorem arrives at a result that follows from a certain
set of premises. It itself asserts nothing about what situations in
the real world fit those premises. Anyone seeking to invoke the
theorem as applicable to a particular situation must establish that
fit, because the 50/50 profit-split result is proven by the theorem
only on those premises.
2 96
Siebrasse and Cotter argued that the court's approach is consistent with
their argument that "'bargaining power' needs to be unpacked before one can
usefully apply it in assessing reasonable royalty." 297 My claim is that the taking's'
added value should be shared. I argue2 98 that the ex-post GR criterion is socially
desirable and should be applied to all civil wrongs. Hypothetical bargaining is
its theoretical equivalent, without directly applying relative bargaining power
considerations.
The desirable ex-ante theoretical equivalence could be precisely
achieved where the court can accurately estimate the value of the expected
damages and profits, or at least one of them (and use NPM ratios). In those rare
cases, the court may estimate the accurate expected compensation and divide the
expected added value from the taking (J = 72 (Eo(D) +Eo()) in Figure 1 above).
In common cases, expected damages or profits are elusive, and to
address this difficulty, courts may apply a direct estimation of the hypothetical
bargaining outcome. To do so, they may estimate compensation by developing
parameters suitable for this task, such as the Georgia-Pacific test. Again, without
directly applying relative bargaining power, considerations might cause a bias
from the desirable point of compensation. As research showed,2 99 the parties'
bargaining power already influences the 15 factors of the Georgia-Pacific test,
293 Id. at 989.
294 Id. at 989 n.175.
295 VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1331-34 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
296 Id. at 1332.
297 See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 175, at 989 n. 175.
298 See supra Part IV.
299 See Sebastian Zimmeck, A Game-Theoretic Model for Reasonable Royalty Calculation, 22
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and further consideration might increase the bias of the court's estimation from
the desirable ex-ante theoretical equivalence to the ex-post GR criterion.
F. Applying the Market Value Criterion
In some case categories, the law uses market value as a compensation
criterion. For example, in cases of trespass, the court may grant DA measured by
the rental value of the land during the period of trespass." Where the trespasser
removed minerals, timber, or crops, the court may grant DA measured by the
value of any article severed, so long as it has a provable separate value.3 1 In case
of harm to personal property, the court usually measures DA based on the market
value of repairing or replacing the property.302 I claim,30 3 however, that the DA
criterion undermines the structure and operation of free and competitive
entitlement markets, creating perfect price discrimination of entitlement
suppliers and leading to too many takings, many of them inefficient, and to
inefficient allocation of resources. The GR criterion is designed to mitigate this
failure.
Even where substitutes are available, replacing the lost good by one
bought in the market usually does not give the victim the full value of the
entitlement. Even in those cases, courts should consider obliging the taker to
repay the victim her damages at the amount of the good's price plus half the
additional ANP derived from the taking. Only where entitlement markets are
highly competitive and the taken entitlement is a uniform good that may be
perfectly substituted by the market alternative (that the victim is able to adjust to
her operation at the infringer's expense)-for example, a regular pen3 -may
market value serve for applying the GR criterion.
As discussed above,30 5 Friedmann explored the possibility of applying
the disgorgement remedy in civil cases, in some cases even for innocent
infringements.30 6 His examples highlight the difference between DA, DoP, and
GR. Example 4.1. Friedmaun argued as follows:
300 See, e.g., DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 15, at 529-32; see also Friedmann, supra
note 165, at 1880-81, 1892-97; Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages, supra note 80, at 12-18.
301 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 15, at 5 10-11.
302 Id. at 545-75.
303 See supra Section IV.A.2.
304 See Arlen, Tort Damages, supra note 39, at 683 (explaining that where, due to a tortious
act, the victim has lost a good that has a perfect market substitute, current court rulings grant her
the good's market price as her DA).
305 See supra Section III.B.
306 See Friedmann, supra note 165.
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The normal measure of recovery for the temporary use of
another's property is the rent or hire rate, but it is possible to
imagine instances in which recovery of profits could be allowed.
Consider an example. The defendant rents the plaintiffs
property to a third party. The plaintiff may recover the full
amount of the rent-even if it exceeds the usual amount payable
for this type of property. This result may be reached irrespective
of whether the defendant was a conscious wrongdoer or whether
he acted innocently.... The contribution of the wrongdoer is
likely to be considered too meager and may be disregarded, even
if he acted innocently.3 o7
Under the GR criterion, however, the court may allow lower payment
for innocent infringement: the amount of the victim's damages calculated as the
usual rent for this type of property plus half the additional ANP (the full rent
amount minus the usual rent for this type of property). Assuming he acts as a real
estate broker, his contribution is estimated at 6% of the value of the $1,000 paid
for the full rent, while the usual rent for this type of property is estimated at $600.
Under the GR, the infringer's ANP is $940 (0.94 x 1,000), and the compensation
is $770 (600+2(940-600)).3o8 Sharing the additional ANP creates an optimal
solution for innocent infringements.
Example 4.2. Friedmann argued that where the land is vacant and
unused, and the infringer uses it for his business-for example, "builds a huge
circus tent, and runs a circus business that yields him considerable profits"-
[i]f he acted consciously and simply decided to take it without
permission, his liability need not be limited to the amount he
would have been required to pay had he made a contract with
the owner.... A proper solution might be to award against the
conscious wrongdoer an amount exceeding the ordinary rent but
falling short of his full profits.
3 09
The GR could address Friedmann's notion. Assume that the infringer
innocently rented the land from a real estate broker. His contribution is estimated
at 80% of the circus's net profits of $10,000, while the usual rent for this type of
property, which he paid to the agent, is $1,000. Under the GR, the infringer's
ANP is $2,000 (0.2 x10,000), and the compensation is $1,500 (1,000+ A(2,000-
1,000))." ° In this case, if we accept the notion that the intentional infringer
should pay his full ANP, he pays $2,000. Next, I discuss in detail the notion that
the intentional infringer should pay his full ANP.
307 Id. at 1892.
308 GR = DA+ 2(ANP-DA) = (DA+ANP).
309 See Friedmann, supra note 165, at 1893.
310 GR = DA+ (ANP-DA) = 2 (DA+ANP).
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G. Moving to the Full Disgorgement Criterion and the Case of Intentional
Takings
As discussed above, from the economic analysis of law perspective, DoP
seeks complete deterrence in cases of inefficient takings, while from the
corrective justice perspective, it is a suitable normative answer to the taker's
unjust gains.3"' Furthermore, the victim is often entitled to compensation at the
amount of her DA or to the disgorgement of the taker's profits, whichever is
higher. The law usually permits DoP in cases of intentional wrongdoing.3 12 There
are fields, however, where the rule is DoP even without intent, as in copyright
infringement.3 13 Moreover, in other fields, the taker's intent does not usually lead
to the disgorgement of his profits (without a suit of unjust enrichment or
particular wrong in intentional torts)-for example, under negligence law.314
Dobbs argued.15 that, in intentional torts, eliminating profits from the
wrong is more relevant to the goal of deterrence than any punitive damage-to-
DA ratio. From the perspective of economic analysis of law, Posner argued3" 6
that DoP is a suitable remedy for intentional torts that are similar to crimes;
however, where the probability of apprehending the taker is less than one,
punitive damages or criminal penalty should be added to provide adequate
deterrence. From the corrective justice perspective, Weinrib argued that
intentional wrong could be perceived as the manifestation of a donative intent,
and therefore, "justice between the parties allows the proprietor to keep what has
thus been given gratuitously." '3 17
There are calls in the literature to expand the rule of restitution of gains.
Hylton suggested3 18 eliminating injurers' gains as a measure of total deterrence
and punishment in tort cases where the offender gains less than the victim loses.
311 See supra Section II.B.
312 See supra Section II.B.
313 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
314 Id.; see also James Edelman, Non-Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract and
Torts, 76 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 328 (2002); Edward M. Iacobucci & Michael J. Trebilcock, An
Economic Analysis of Waiver of Tort in Negligence Actions, 66 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 173 (2016).
For this approach in Australia and the Commonwealth, see Edelman, supra note 314; Richard S.
Markovits, Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Content of the Corrective-Justice-Securing Tort Law
of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 243, 282-83 (2006); and Michael Tilbury,
Reconstructing Damages, 27 MELBOURNE U. L. REv. 697, 703-05 (2003).
315 See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-
Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REv. 831 (1989).
316 See POSNER, supra note 49, at 239-45.
317 See Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages, supra note 80, at 27. For criticism of Weinrib's
arguments and for other corrective justice justifications for DoP, see Gordley, supra note 80.
318 See Hylton, supra note 73. For a discussion of Hylton's proposal, see supra Section T.B.
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As we have seen, Cooter and Porat proposed3"9 DDA. And as discussed above, 320
a possible criticism of Hylton's argument is that it does not allow efficient
takings, and a possible counterargument to Cooter and Porat's proposal is that
DDA do not create sufficient deterrence to achieve optimal social welfare or
correction of wrongs.
As presented above,3 21 Friedmann considered the advantages of
expanding the application of the disgorgement remedy in civil cases, in some
cases even for innocent infringements,3 22 and proposed four alternative schemes
to determine disgorgement.3 23 Dagan and Heller proposed3 24 three similar
possible solutions to a division of profits from common property like family
farms, where one commoner autonomously decided to use the commons's
resources without his partners' consent.
According to the classification in this article, there are three main
schemes of compensation in Friedmann's and in Dagan and Heller's theories:
full disgorgement (the net profits to the right's owner), DA (the right's owner
receives its market value) and the intermediate schemes of sharing in accordance
with commoners' relative contribution. The latter is restricted to a specific
context of joint ventures or common property where each commoner share is
determined in advance, for example, by an investment contract. Therefore, in the
context of predetermined shares in common property rights, it is a rule of
accession and not disgorgement.32 5
This article showed that the GR is applied and that it is the unique
socially optimal rule of compensation for all civil wrongs, based on law and
economics, as well as normative theories. All theories lead to the same socially
desirable point and compromise between the theories is unnecessary. While the
basic compensation rule may be clear, the reasons for moving from the GR
criterion to full disgorgement (or another remedy) and the trigger to applying it
might be different for each theory and require further research.
319 See Cooter & Porat, supra note 81, at 249-50. For a discussion ofCooter & Porat's proposal,
see supra Section II1B.
320 See supra Section 1I1.B.
321 See supra Section 1II.B.
322 ' See Friedmann, supra note 165.
323 Id. at 1924-25. For Friedmann's alternative suggestions for determining disgorgement, see
supra Section III.B.
324 See Dagan & Heller, supra note 170.
325 For a discussion of the advantages of applying the accession rule in intellectual property
disputes between an innocent buyer of a product and an owner of intellectual property whose right
has been integrated in the product by a producer, without her consent, see Erez Shaham & Noam
Sher, A Purchaser of a Product v. an Owner of Stolen Intellectual Property: The Revival of the
Accession Rule, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 319 (2006).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Using both law and economics theories-including game theory,
microeconomics, and behavioral economics-and normative theories of
corrective and distributive justice, I demonstrated that a socially efficient and
just criterion for compensation for all civil wrongs exists and called it the Golden
Rule (GR).
The article presented the notion that members of society have the right
to sell by themselves their rights or entitlements-property, intellectual property,
or individual rights, namely the right of disposition. When taking occurs, the
value of this right should be protected by law. Where the law uses the damages
awards (DA) criterion for compensation, it eliminates the value of the right to
negotiate, grants it solely to the taker, and allocates all business and gain
opportunities to the takers of the society. This distorts the process of free
allocation of resources in all markets.
We began32 6 with Einstein insisting that the moon exists not only when
he looks at it, an analogy for his belief that particles have properties whether or
not they are measured. We then proposed another analogy, namely the existence
of an efficient and just welfare point in civil law, regardless of our ability to
observe and to measure it. The current law usually ignores it and gives
manufacturers and other potential takers license for unlawful takings from
individuals at a payment equal to the entitlement's costs.
Following Bohr and Englard's notion of the applicability of the physical
principle of complementarity to human phenomena,3 27 my research question
examined law and economics and normative theories for similarities and
differences, in search for the optimal rule of compensation for all civil wrongs,
and found that the same GR appeared in all.
Based on further research, the reasons and conditions for moving to
another compensation criterion, such as the higher between full disgorgement of
profits (DoP) and DA, could be different between law and economics theories
and normative theories, as well as between different wrongs. The existence of a
foundation and exit point, namely the GR unique point, however, may have
important reciprocity implications for many issues. The need for additional
research of the reasons and conditions for transition from one rule to another,
based on the various theories, applies to the shift from the GR compensation
remedy to injunctions, using, for example, the United States Supreme Court's
influential eBay ruling. 328
326 See supra Part I.
327 See supra notes 2 3 and accompanying text.
328 For the influential eBay ruling, see supra note 97 and accompanying text. Elsewhere, I
argued that in the torts context, the GR criterion makes the outcomes of bargaining under liability
and property rules similar, albeit not identical, and reduces the transaction costs of their
application. I claimed that liability and property rules should serve the GR as the proper goal of
[Vol. 121
60
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss1/8
ONE RULE TO COMPENSATE THEM ALL
For all civil wrongs, there is only one socially optimal, efficient, and just
compensation criterion. For implementation, and as a foundation to further
research, the law should respect it and aim to share the additional attributed net
profits derived from wrongful takings.
tort law and be employed in a specific case or category of cases if best suitable for this objective.
See Sher, supra note 25.
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